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COMMANDER NAVAL AIR FORCES (CNAF) AIRCRAFT 
OPERATIONS MAINTENANCE (AOM): AN EXAMINATION OF 
EFFECTIVENESS IN MAINTAINING AND OPERATING AN 
AGING AIRCRAFT FLEET 
 
ABSTRACT 
Naval aviation serves as a vital component of many air and ground task organized 
forces vying for a share of the Department of Defense (DoD) budget.  The decisions in 
the 1990s to reduce purchases of new equipment left the Navy with aging fleets of 
aircraft that are increasingly expensive to maintain.  This situation coupled with the cost 
of the Global War on Terror has created a cycle in which more funds are spent 
maintaining older equipment at the expense of new purchases.  This has lead to still older 
equipment and higher maintenance costs.  The increases in the costs of operating and 
maintaining aging military equipment have created a budgetary crisis in the Department 
of Defense.    
The Commander Naval Air Forces (CNAF), Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. 
Pacific Fleet (COMNAVAIRPAC), and Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic 
Fleet (COMNAVAIRLANT), face the great challenge of effectively vying for their share 
of  the 37 percent of the DoD budget that pays for the day-to-day costs of Operation and 
Maintenance (O&M) (CBO, 1997).  Precisely identifying budgeting and costs for 
sustaining Aircraft Operations Maintenance (AOM) of the Navy’s aging fleet of aircraft 
is vital to preserving an essential component of current war fighting doctrine.  
Unfortunately, establishing the association between age and costs is complex.  Costs are 
likely to be affected by an aircraft’s age, component technology, the number of flight 
hours, manner in which the aircraft is flown, and the resources devoted to maintenance.  
Therefore, to better identify costs and maintenance trends of value to Naval aviation, the 
cost drivers for AOM should be investigated.   
The purpose of this study is to analyze the effectiveness of the aircraft 
maintenance process in conjunction with actions to remove impediments to non-deployed 
aviation readiness.  The methodology for the study involves an analysis of specific 
 vi
changes in training of personnel, equipping depots, executing maintenance programs, and 
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The intent of this study is to serve a dual purpose.  First, the report will provide a 
summarization of the funding elements of Intermediate Maintenance Activity 
(IMA)/Organizational Maintenance Activity (OMA).  Identifying the funding 
formulation and the current cost trends of maintaining an aging fleet of aircraft will 
emphasize the need for strategic positioning with effective programs and financial plans 
to meet the Chief of Naval Operations’ (CNO) readiness goals.  Second, the research will 
provide an analysis of current and future maintenance programs designed to build 
efficiency and save money.  Specifically, the study entails an examination of the Radar 
Center of Excellence (COE) at Naval Air Station (NAS) Lemoore as it relates to cost-
wise readiness and Enterprise AIRSpeed.  These programs highlight changes following 
the Navy’s attempt at transformation to a more efficient and lean aircraft maintenance 
process model.  The study aims to provide insight into whether these changes have 
resulted in an improvement in program efficiency and achievement of cost savings in 
Aircraft Operations Maintenance (AOM) expense accounts.  
 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The body of the project addresses the following questions: 
1. Primary Research Question 
To what degree of effectiveness is the Navy presently able to meet its aircraft 
maintenance requirements with its current resources?  
2. Secondary Research Questions  
            a. What specific changes, if any, have been made to aircraft maintenance 
process models to improve efficiency and effectiveness of current programs?   
           b. If changes have been made, have they produced any significant and 
measurable improvements in readiness and cost?   
           c. How will future budgeting affect aircraft maintenance processes? 
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C. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
To meet our objectives, we reviewed the current processes and future initiatives 
associated with AOM.  To accomplish this review, we selected to visit Commander 
Naval Air Forces; NAS North Island and NAS Lemoore.  While at these commands we 
were able to conduct interviews with budget analysts, aircraft maintenance policy 
officers, and AIRSpeed officers.  In addition, we also reviewed data used by aircraft 
maintenance policy officers and AIRSpeed officers to determine resource requirements 
essential in defining maintenance capabilities.  In order to properly analyze the this data, 
we also reviewed Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) studies, Base Realignment and Closure 
(BRAC) reports, General Accounting Office (GAO) reports, public laws pertaining to 
Department of Defense (DoD) maintenance, Naval Aviation Maintenance Subsystem 
Reporting Plus (NAMSR Plus) maintenance and material data, and Fiscal Year 2003 – 
Fiscal Year 2004 (FY03-FY04) Execution Operations Plan-20s (OP-20), in order to (1) 
understand the ability of gaining depots to absorb additional work loads; and (2) 
understand legislative actions mandating specific criteria relating to maintenance 
initiatives.     
 
D. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
The study contains five chapters. 
Chapter I provides an introduction to the study that includes a section on purpose, 
scope and methodology, and a statement of primary and secondary research questions. 
Chapter II provides an overview of the budgeting and funding elements relating to 
AOM expense accounts.  Specific sections include discussion of the Operational 
Functional Category-50 (OFC-50) account, its funding structure, and budgeting process.  
This chapter will also consider Naval Aviation’s paradigm shift from “readiness at any 




Chapter III provides a more detailed examination of cost-wise readiness and its 
relationship to Enterprise AIRSpeed (CNAF, 2005).  This chapter discusses goals and 
vision, context and perspectives, functional performance, initiatives considered and key 
assumptions. 
Chapter IV provides an examination of the Radar COE at NAS Lemoore.  This 
chapter discusses the functional process descriptions, performance impacts and metrics, 
and operational cost savings associated with the COE.  This chapter examines the impact 
of the COE on future aviation maintenance innovations since it was established as an 
offshoot of cost-wise readiness standards.   
Chapter V provides conclusions, a summary of answers to the primary and 
secondary research questions, and recommendations to improve the Navy’s re-sourcing 
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II. BACKGROUND  
A. OVERVIEW  
Prior to 11 September 2001, we lived in a post-Cold War world where the U.S. 
Navy had changed its doctrine and reduced its size.  We are now living in a world 
engulfed in a War on Terror where our armed forces, more specifically the U.S. Navy, 
have seen an increase in worldwide operations.  According to the Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO), the Department of the Navy’s (DoN) budget has shrunk by about 35 
percent since 1985 (adjusting for inflation) (CBO, 2001).  In light of these facts, the Navy 
has found it increasingly difficult to modernize the Fleet and maintain a level of 
operational readiness that supports the projection of overseas presence as in the past.    
Naval aviation serves as a vital component of many air and ground task organized 
forces vying for a share of the DoD budget.  Decisions in the 1990s to reduce purchases 
of new equipment left the Navy with aging fleets of aircraft that are increasingly 
expensive to maintain.  This situation coupled with the cost of the War on Terror has 
created a cycle in which more funds are spent maintaining older equipment at the expense 
of new purchases and planned modernization of the Fleet.  This has lead to still older 
equipment and higher maintenance costs.  The increases in the costs of operating and 
maintaining aging military equipment have created a budgetary crisis in the DoD and the 
DoN.   
The Commander Naval Air Forces (CNAF), Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. 
Pacific Fleet (COMNAVAIRPAC), and Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic 
Fleet (COMNAVAIRLANT), face the great challenge of effectively vying for their share 
of  the 37 percent of the DoD budget that pays for the day-to-day costs of Operation and 
Maintenance (O&M) (CBO, 2005).  Precisely identifying budgeting and costs for 
sustaining AOM of the Navy’s aging fleet of aircraft is vital to preserving an essential 
component of current war fighting doctrine.  Unfortunately, establishing the association 
between age and costs is complex.  Costs are affected by the age and types of 
components of the aircraft, the number of hours managed in the Flight Hour Program 
(FHP), the manner in which the aircraft is flown, and the resources devoted to 
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maintaining the aircraft over time.  Additionally, high operation tempos have led to the 
need to “cross deck” deployed assets and the deferral of intermediate and depot 
maintenance.  Deferred maintenance has the potential to increase maintenance actions 
and support costs. 
 
B. AIRCRAFT DEPOT MAINTENANCE 
Equipment maintenance concepts in DoD use three levels of maintenance:  
Organizational maintenance (O-level) consists of the on-equipment tasks 
necessary for day-to-day operation, including inspection and servicing and 
remove-and-replace operations for failed components (includes so-called 
line replaceable units or weapon replaceable assemblies).  
Intermediate maintenance (I-level) consists of off-equipment repair 
capabilities possessed by operating units and in-theater sustainment 
organizations.  These capabilities can be quite extensive, and include 
remove-and-replace operations for subcomponents of line replaceable 
units (so-called shop replaceable units or assemblies), local manufacture, 
and other repair capabilities.  
Depot maintenance (D-level) consists of all repairs beyond the capabilities 
of the operating units, including rebuild, overhaul, and extensive 
modification of equipment platforms, systems, and subsystems.  The depot 
level is the ultimate source of repair (OSD, 2004).  
Depot maintenance sustains equipment throughout its life cycle through the 
performance of major repairs, calibrations, overhaul, complete rebuild of an entire 
weapon system (e.g., aircraft, ship, or truck), complete rebuild of an assembly (e.g., 
engine), and the complete rebuild of subassemblies (e.g., engine blades).  Depot 
maintenance also encompasses the installation of modifications to extend the operational 
life of weapon systems or improve their performance.  Corrosion control, structural 
rehabilitation and supporting lower level maintenance activities with overflow 
maintenance are also critical activities at maintenance depots.   
The Aircraft Depot Maintenance program sustains AOM by providing airframe, 
engine, and component rework to meet established CNO readiness goals.  The DoD is 
required by Title 10 U.S.C. Section 2464 to perform organic maintenance on its materiel.  
DoD Directive 4151.18 states that "[m]aintenance programs are structured for meeting 
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readiness and sustainability objectives (including mobilization and surge capabilities) of 
national defense strategic and contingency requirements."  These national requirements 
include Naval air power as a major component.  Recurring maintenance is required on all 
U.S. Navy aircraft to keep them mission-ready and safe for continuous operations in 
support of the defense of the nation. 
The need for Naval Aviation is outlined in documents such as Naval Aviation 
Vision 2020 and Sea Power 21.  They embody the collaboration of Fleet officers, 
planners, and Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) subject matter experts.  More 
than half a dozen technology roadmaps depict how Naval Aviation will support the 
Navy's over-arching transformation in projecting air support throughout the world.   
The Navy has Title 10 responsibility for the maintenance of its aircraft and the 
continuous review of its maintenance procedures and models to increase its efficiency.  
Title 10 U.S.C. Section 2464 “provides that DoD activities maintain a logistics capability 
sufficient to ensure technical competence and resources necessary for an effective and 
timely response to a mobilization or other national defense emergency” (GAO-93-13, 
1993).  In addition, activities are limited in the use of contracting services for the 
maintenance of mission essential equipment under Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) Circular A-76 (GAO-93-13, 1993).  Such practices determine workload 
requirements and performance measurement.  The NAVAIR Depot Maintenance program 
allows Naval aircraft to operate in a high degree of readiness and has contributed greatly 
to the operational success of the Navy.   
The management of AOM is a high priority within the Navy, where funds are 
exclusively targeted for it using the Naval Aviation Maintenance and Material 
Management System.  The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD); the Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy, Financial Management and Comptroller, Office of Budget 
Division (FMB); and Fleet budget offices conducts mid-year reviews to ensure that funds 
are being properly executed within the program (OSD, 2006).  Within the Department of 
the Navy, FMB formulates the Navy budget which includes supplemental requests, 
reprogramming, monitoring budget execution, and reporting on budget execution to the 
Under Secretary of the Department of Defense, Comptroller (OSD, 2006).  All funds 
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used for AOM are contained within specific sub-activity groups which will be discussed 
later on.  The importance of AOM is further highlighted by the fact that congressional 
approval is required before adjusting funds of $15 million or greater from this fund code. 
Each aircraft type-model-series (T/M/S) has a tailored maintenance program 
designed to keep it in a high state of material readiness.  The Navy uses a Reliability 
Centered Maintenance method to identify maintenance required to maintain aircraft at a 
minimal cost.  This method is a commonly used procedure to analyze the equipment 
found in a specific process.  It helps create a maintenance interval and schedule based on 
the reliability of that equipment.  Today’s need for economic efficiency and reduction of 
downtime requires that preventative maintenance be implemented based on important 
factors such as mean time to repair (MTTR) and mean time between failures (MTBF).  
The Navy however uses the metrics of output of airframes and engines necessary to meet 
readiness requirements.  Performance metrics are reported in the Navy FY06 budget.  
The Navy's goal is to have 73% of its aircraft Full Mission Capable (FMC) 
(OPNAVINST 4790.2J, 2005).  The FMC rate refers to the availability of aircraft to carry 
out their assigned mission (GAO-03-300, 2003).   
Long-term estimates of maintenance actions are listed out to the year 2014 in the 
Program Objective Memorandum (POM).  The Navy budget planning documents contain 
estimated airframe and engine induction requirements for future years to attempt to meet 
100% of the maintenance requirements for deployed squadrons and achieve 90% or better 
fill rates for parts and component requirements.  The outlying projections indicate the 
estimated pieces needing induction into maintenance to support CNO readiness goals.  
The Navy bases these estimates on previous year’s performance measures, age of 
equipment, and inflation adjustments.  Funding actions for specific aircraft maintenance 
actions can be tracked through the review of monthly readiness reports and supporting 
budget planning documents that support the President's budget request.   
 
C. FUNDING STRUCTURE 
The DoN publishes a planning document in the form of the OP-20 to establish the 
annual flying hours (MCO 3125.1A, 2005).  The OP-20 is used for FHP O&M funding 
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and fleet planning.  The funds are then allocated to Activity Group/Sub-Activity Group 
(AGSAG).  The AGSAG is a four-character alphanumeric code used in the 
appropriations process to define and classify resources by specific purpose.  
  
• AGSAG 1A1A – 1A  Air Operations, 1A Mission and other Flight 
Operations, which includes Tactical Aircraft operations and Fleet Air 
Support (FAS) operations.  
• AGSAG 1A2A – 1A  Air Operations,  2A Fleet Air Training or Fleet 
Refresher Squadron trains new pilots or transitioning pilots.    
Both 1A1A and 1A2A are broken down into OFC to provide specific use of 
funds.  This study will refer to elements of OFC-50, IMA/OMA funding.  Within the 
OFC-50 there are several performance metrics that form the basis for the budgeting of 
funding elements corresponding to AOM expense accounts assigned a Special Interest 
Category (SIC) designation to each Fund Code as follows: 7L Consumables and 9S 
Aviation Depot Level Repairable (AVDLR).   
Under Fund Code 7L, consumables are inexpensive items used to support flight 
operations.  Used for both O-Level and I-Level maintenance functions, funding occurs 
for the acquisition of consumable parts, materials, tools, lubricants and services to repair 
aircraft, support equipment, or aeronautical components.  The OP-20 identifies the costs 
for consumables under the SIC FM and is part of the total FHP cost per hour calculation.   
An AVDLR is a high dollar item that requires repair at the D-Level and is 
identified in monthly Budget Operational Reports (BOR) under Fund Code 9S.  The 
AN/APG-65/73 F-18 radar, “the [number] 2 degrader on the top ten” list at Aircraft 
Intermediate Maintenance Department (AIMD) NAS Lemoore, is an example of an 
AVDLR that represents the most significant dollar investment in accomplishing repairs 
and improved management of these components to increased  readiness  of  F-18 
squadrons (Kemna, 2005).  The Navy Working Capital Fund (NWCF) funds the repair of 
an AVDLR.  While the end user will initiate an AVDLR demand, the local IMA will 
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determine whether the request will result in an AVDLR NWCF charge.  Consequently, 
the end user or local IMA retains control of the AVDLR funds and corresponding 
accounting responsibilities.  The OP-20 identifies an AVDLR under SIC FA and is part 
of the total FHP cost per hour calculation. 
Contract maintenance is the outsourcing of aircraft maintenance and support 
services to civilian or NWCF activities to support the end user.  Costs include fixed and 
variable cost estimates.  Program fixed costs obligate funds in spite of hours flown, while 
projected squadron flight hours determine variable costs.  Contract maintenance is 
identified as SIC FW on the OP-20 and is part of the cost per hour calculation.  
 
1. Budgeting and the Budget Process 
OFC-50 expenses account for 80 percent (Maintenance Consumables + Contract 
Maintenance + Repairables) of the direct flight hour costs to OP-20 as depicted in Figure 
1.  Furthermore, the percentages in Figure 1 represent the average for the entire Fleet and 
would shift dramatically for different aircraft T/M/S.  The inherent uncertainty of 
maintenance costs, however, has prevented an accurate estimation of projected costs, 
which results in recurring funding shortfalls and the need for inventive revenue 
generating activities.  Each program carries a specific pricing model designed to obtain 






Figure 1.   Diagram of OP-20 Direct Costs.   
                           Source: OPNAV 43 Flight Hour Program Brief May 2005.  
 
The AVDLR pricing model uses four inputs in determining the AVDLR cost per 
hour (by T/M/S) as presented in the OP-20.  The four variables include a Certified Actual 
Expenditure Cost per Hour, a CNA Demand Factor, Forecasted Programmatic 
Adjustments as submitted through the Cost Adjustment and Visibility Tracking System 
(CAVTS), and a baseline Escalation Factor/Rate Adjustment.  The Certified Actual 
Expenditure variable is a base for determining funding requirements from the most recent 
certified Flight Hour Cost Report (FHCR).  The certified figure in use is typically two 
years old since the prior year’s execution numbers do not get certified by NAVAIR, Code 
6.8, in time for incorporation into the following OP-20 calculation.  Consequently, the 
FY06 AVDLR funding calculation uses FY04 cost per hour data as its base.  The CNA 
demand factor is a multiplier that takes into account the age of the Navy’s fleet of aircraft 
and the ensuing increase in failure rates of its major components.  The Forecast 
Programmatic Adjustment allows for adjustments to funding levels based on inputs from 
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DoD and NWCF combined rate used to adjust the cost per hour baseline (Keating & 
Paulk, 1998).  These variables are used to generate the following equation to project 
AVDLR costs per hour: Certified Actual Expenditures  X Demand Factor (CNA) +/- 
Forecast Programmatic Adjustments/(CAVTS X Escalation Factor/Rate Adjustment ÷ 
Projected flight hours=Projected AVDLR cost per hour.   
The Consumables pricing model uses three inputs in calculating the SIC cost per 
hour.  The three variables include the Certified Actual Expenditure Cost per Hour, 
Forecasted Programmatic Adjustments as submitted through CAVTS, and the NWCF 
baseline Escalation Factor/Rate Adjustment.  These variables are used to generate the 
following equation to project consumables costs per hour:  Certified Actual Expenditures 
X Demand Factor (CNA) +/-  Forecast Programmatic Adjustments/CAVTS X  Escalation 
Factor/Rate Adjustment ÷ Projected flight hours = Projected consumables cost per hour.  
The Contract Maintenance pricing model uses two inputs in calculating the SIC 
projected contract cost per hour.  The two variables include NAVAIR sponsored and 
Fleet-sponsored maintenance contracts.  These variables are used to generate the 
following equation to project Contract costs per hour: NAVAIR-sponsored maintenance 
contracts + Fleet-sponsored maintenance contracts ÷ Projected flight hours = Projected 













Figure 2.   Histogram of Costs Per Hour.   
                       Source: OPNAV 43 Flight Hour Program Brief May 2005.  
 
Figure 2 is a historical representation depicting that as the costs per hour have 
increased, the number of flight hours and aircraft have decreased.  The costs per hour in 
the outlying years that show decreases are associated with future engine innovations and 
the inclusion of platforms such as the V-22 shifting to Depot accounts.  Of the overall 
$122 million price increase to DoD Depot Maintenance, $91 million will be FY06 
distributed to Navy aircraft maintenance with the balance spread across various 
components and maintenance categories.  The Navy Depot Maintenance Program 
decreased by $124.7 million in FY06 in comparison to the previous fiscal year.   
In briefs prepared by Peter Francis and Geoff Shaw on the Effect of Aircraft Age 
on Maintenance Costs, 2000; and Laurence Stoll and Stan Davis on Aircraft Age Impact 
on Individual Operating and Support Cost Elements, 1993, were early studies conducted 
by NAVAIR, the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) and the CBO, concluded that this 
approach is better at sorting out factors that affect O&M costs in relation to aircraft 
maintenance (CBO, 2001).  For example, CBO used data from the Navy's Visibility and 
Costs Per Flight Hour
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Management of Operating and Support Costs database for the years 1986 to 1999 for 13 
different Navy aircraft totaling 164 observations.  With the type of aircraft, year, 
inventory, and operation tempo held constant, one additional year of age was associated 
with an increase in Operations and Support costs of 2.4 percent per year and an increase 
in O&M costs of 2.6 percent per year.  Unfortunately, programs are slowly having their 
budgets reduced or stopped all together because of the projection of inadequate funding 
in the outlying fiscal years.  In spite of these facts, Naval Aviation still must maintain a 
level of force readiness capable of projecting combat power across the globe.  Innovative 
thinkers such as that articulated by Vice Admiral Malone comprehends that combat 
capabilities are gained through strategic investments, “...involv [ing] more than applying 
increased dollars, but critical investments in readiness” (Malone, 2004).     
 
D. INCREASING COST AWARENESS 
Prior to August 2001, the institutional approach to readiness within Naval 
Aviation was readiness at any cost, i.e., pour dollars into achieving capabilities today at 
the expense of future capabilities.  Now the emphasis is on achieving readiness through 
more efficient and innovative use of infrastructure, process management, personnel, and 
most of all, effort devoted to more careful use of every dollar.  This new way of thinking 
is called cost-wise readiness. 
To illustrate the difference between readiness at any cost and cost-wise readiness, 
one can compare the maintenance of the AN/APG-65/73 radar before and after the 
application of the cost-wise readiness approach.  The AN/APG-65/73 radar is a critical 
component of the F-18 Super Hornet, providing fire control capabilities during air-to-air 
and air-to-ground missions.  In the past if the radar failed, the Fleet could possibly 
declare it Beyond Capability of Maintenance (BCM) and send the entire radar to the 
depot, thus incurring the cost to buy a new radar.  For every repairable asset there is a 
unit price and a net price.  If an item is replaced, the unit price is the replacement cost 
that the Navy Inventory Control Point (NAVICP) pays to replace the asset from the 
original equipment manufacturer (OEM).  The net price is the repair price that the 
organization pays using FHP money.  An OEM is a company that builds components 
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which are used in products sold by another company.  For example, a company separate 
from the one that actually markets and sells the computer may manufacture a hard drive 
in a computer.  When the term OEM is used in relation to aircraft maintenance, it refers 
to the manufacturer that makes the component of the weapon system.  Within the F-18 
Super Hornet, Boeing, Michelin, General Electric, Raytheon, Honeywell, and Michelin 
are all OEMs that manufacture distinct components of the aircraft.  At the AIMD NAS 
Lemoore, there is a Radar COE where AN/APG-65/73 radars are sent.  Currently, the 
COE still processes BCM assets to the D-Level with goals of avoiding more BCM assets 
through its gained cross-functional focus, permanent Raytheon technician on station, and 
better business practices; all improvements that translate to cost avoidance as the Radar 
COE matures as a Fleet Readiness Center (FRC).  
The COE will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter IV but was introduced to 
demonstrate the fundamental process changes that are taking hold in Navy aircraft 
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III. COST-WISE READINESS AND ENTERPRISE AIRSPEED 
INITIATIVES 
A. GOALS AND VISION 
On 10 September 2001, the Secretary of Defense outlined a vision for 
transforming the DoD in which he called for dramatic changes in management, 
technology, and business practices.  The Secretary stated that transformation was a matter 
of utmost urgency because ultimately the security of the nation was at stake.  The very 
next day, devastating terrorist attacks drew us into a global war against an unconventional 
enemy and underscored the need for defense transformation (DoD, 2005).  Since 11 
September 2001 (9/11), the reasons for change have become crystal clear to senior 
military leaders: transform, recapitalize, and modernize the Navy in order to preserve 
freedom and deter aggression from the enemy. 
 
1. Navy Transformation 
The Navy is transforming to meet new demands created by shifts in global threats 
to our nation and its allies.  In so doing, it recognizes the need to modernize its weapon 
systems and reengineer its resources and requirements.  The CNO recognized the 
necessity of establishing Naval doctrine to emphasize the synergy between the various 
commands as the Navy reacts to threat conditions and sets the primus for Naval 
preparedness and planning (OSD, 2004). 
a. Sea Power 21 
The Navy’s guiding doctrine for transformation is outlined in Sea Power 
21, a blueprint for change that will ensure the nation possesses a 21st Century Navy to 
meet 21st Century threats.  Its goal is to align, organize, integrate, and transform the Navy 
to meet future challenges and capabilities.  Sea Power 21 encompasses the concepts Sea 
Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing through a supporting triad of organizational processes: 
Sea Trial, Sea Warrior, and Sea Enterprise—initiatives that will align and accelerate the 
development of enhanced warfighting capabilities for the Fleet (Mullen, 2006.)  
 18
Sea Enterprise is essential to Sea Power 21.  It is the Navy’s endeavor to 
implement required business process change and create efficiencies, freeing resources for 
investment in recapitalization and transformation.  This Navy Enterprise alignment is a 
fundamental change to the business of manning, training, and equipping the Navy.  The 
Navy is moving away from decentralized management organizations and processes 
toward adopting an organizational behavior model with a single focus:  providing 
operational forces ready for tasking in the most cost-effective manner.  The enterprise 
management concept establishes a strategic linkage between warfare enterprises (i.e., 
Surface Warfare, Naval Aviation, Undersea Warfare, etc.) and support elements (i.e. 
Manpower, Training & Education, Acquisition, Technical Authority, Logistics, 
Installations, Science & Technology, etc.).  These enablers support the Fleet Readiness 
Enterprise in managing value streams, promoting cost transparency, and leveraging 
common processes and metrics to assess effectiveness and efficiency in delivering 
warfighting surge capabilities to the combatant commanders (DoD, 2006.) 
b. Fleet Readiness Plan 
The Fleet Response Plan (FRP) is the operational readiness framework 
through which the Navy meets global Combatant Commander (COCOM) requirements 
for forward deployed forces and crisis surge response.  It supports Sea Power 21.  The 
FRP enables the Navy to respond to emergent COCOM requests for forces in the case of 
a national crisis or a contingency operation.  FRP is mission-driven, capabilities-based, 
and provides the right readiness at the right time, and at the right cost (HASC, 2006).  It 
changes the way we operate, train, man, and maintain the Fleet.  CNAF has the 
responsibility of manning, equipping, and training Naval aviation forces.  Previously 
these functions were based on an 18-month readiness cycle.  The advent of FRP and its 
flexibility puts CNAF in the position of making long-range planning decisions based on 
greater uncertainty.  The essence of FRP is “targeted readiness” finding new and cost-
effective ways to tailor the mission readiness of Naval forces (Badertscher, Bahjat, & 
Pierce, 2005).  With FRP, the Navy can deploy agile, flexible, and scalable Naval forces 
capable of surging quickly to deal with unexpected threats, homeland defense, 
humanitarian disasters, and contingency operations (HASC, 2006).   
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A key element in the success of the FRP has been the implementation and 
maturation of the Regional Maintenance Plan, a 1990’s initiative to gain efficiencies by 
consolidating like functions in a geographic region, called Regional Maintenance Centers 
(RMC).  The RMCs have the responsibility as well as the resources and flexibility to 
sustain readiness and adapt to changing priorities in maintaining a surge ready force.  
Like the RMC concept, the aviation community has developed a similar initiative, FRCs, 
a component developed from the 2005 BRAC process (HASC, 2006).  The concept of the 
FRC will be discussed in greater detail in section III.B.3 of this chapter.   
 
2. Naval Aviation Transformation 
Naval Aviation has always been successful at generating readiness; however, it 
has always been accomplished at a great cost.  Traditionally, aviators receive funding 
based on the number of flight hours completed.  By all accounts, the number of flight 
hours accomplished is a valid measurement to ensure pilots remain operationally 
proficient to confront unconventional threats.  Further assessment by aviation experts 
identified the occurrence of flight operations over and beyond the basic flight hour 
requirements.  Flying for the sake of increasing funding levels is a reversal of common 
business thinking, a waste of money.  Excessive flight hours increased the occurrence of 
aircraft needing unscheduled or corrective maintenance, decreased the mean time 
between maintenance (MTBM), and increased labor and material costs.  This assessment 
required a change in how readiness is characterized; rather than require “readiness at any 
cost”, senior leadership recognized that a shift in paradigm was necessary to meet the 
FRP for future surge requirements.  Maintaining Naval Aviation today while building the 
aviation forces of tomorrow requires the aviation community to embark on a “cost-wise 
readiness” journey to ensure that an excessive amount of current readiness is not 
purchased today at the expense of future readiness requirements.  Inefficiencies resulting 
from stockpiling spares, inept maintenance operations, or constrained processes 




a. Naval Aviation Enterprise 
The Naval Aviation Enterprise (NAE) system is a direct subset of the Sea 
Enterprise initiative.  It is a warfighting partnership forged between aviation stakeholders 
where independent issues affecting multiple commands are resolved on an Enterprise-
wide basis.  The enterprise approach creates synergy between people, readiness, and costs 
(Malone, 2004) in order to achieve NAE’s vision “to deliver the right force, with the right 
readiness, at the right cost, at the right time-today, and in the future” (Badertscher, et al., 
2005). 
The efficiency and effectiveness of NAE is measured through a single 
Fleet driven metric of aircraft ready for tasking (RFT) at reduced cost.  This metric 
tracks how well the NAE delivers on the things it values: cost-wise readiness (tied to the 
demands of COCOMs); improved time on wing (better equipment with better 
maintenance so that it stays on the aircraft longer); greater speed/reduced cycle time 
(aircraft and components spending less time in maintenance); improved reliability 
(quality); reduced total cost; and implementing process efficiencies (Ireland, 2006). 
The concept for the current NAE program originated in the late 1990s 
when problems in the aviator production and training pipeline led to pilot and Naval 
Flight Officer shortfalls.  In 1998 the Naval Aviation Pilot Production Improvement 
(NAPPI) program was developed to guide the aviation community in understanding and 
managing the interdependencies of manpower, training, and equipment – three entities 
that had historically operated independently.  What was once a disjointed, stovepiped 
process became coordinated and aligned, and the process became faster and more 
effective.  Several hundred additional pilots were produced without spending any 
additional money.  The program delivered exactly what the Naval aviation community 
needed, a more effective force.  With NAPPI, Naval Aviation had the beginnings of an 
enterprise (NAF, 2005). 
The NAE enables communication across all elements of the Enterprise, 
fosters organizational alignment, encourages inter-agency and inter-service integration, 
stimulates a culture of productivity, and facilitates change to advance and improve 
readiness.  Working together optimizes the use of existing resources, manages the cost 
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associated with generating readiness, and harnesses change as a positive force within 
[the] Navy and Marine Corps (Badertscher, et al., 2005).    
(1)  NAE Organizational Structure.  The organizational structure 
of the NAE consists of a group of core stakeholders, senior leaders within the aviation 
community; and a Board of Directors comprised of representatives from approximately 
20 organizations that are involved in all aspects of Naval Aviation readiness 
(Badertscher, et al., 2005).  Additionally, the NAE has three Cross Functional Teams 
(CFT): Readiness, Training, and Cost Management; and a transition team working on 
human capital strategy (Navy Office of Information, 2005).  The NAE core stakeholders 
include the following members: 
• Commander, Naval Air Forces (NAE Chief Executive Officer) 
• Commander, Naval Air Systems Command (NAE Chief Operating 
Officer) 
• Deputy Commandant for Aviation, Headquarters Marine Corps 
• Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet 
• Chief of Naval Air Training 
• Director, Air Warfare Division (OPNAV N78) 
• Director, Fleet Readiness Division (OPNAV N43) 
(2)  NAE Strategic Goals.  The NAE strategic goals are to balance 
current and future readiness, reduce the cost of doing business, enhance agility, and 
improve alignment to attain and maintain visibility across the Enterprise (Badertscher, et 
al., 2005).  The intricate elements of these goals include:  
• Balance Current and Future Readiness 
- Support the FRP safely, with improved organizational alignment and 
operational effectiveness 
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- Maintain direct, frequent, and continuous communication with Navy 
Type Wing and Marine Wing Commanders to produce combat-ready 
aircraft at reduced cost 
- Strengthen development and acquisition to maximize the return the 
recapitalized funds 
• Reduce the Cost of Doing Business 
- Work across Systems Commands (SYSCOM)/Joint boundaries to 
maximize our share of the resources 
- Provide more products and more capability per dollar to the Fleet 
- Use dollars saved through improved efficiencies to upgrade and 
modernize our aging force 
• Enhance Agility 
- Improve our responsiveness and adaptability 
- Communicate better with the Fleet, streamline decision making, 
compress management layers, demand accountability, and tailor 
product-delivery processes 
• Improve Alignment 
- Align with the strategic direction of higher authority outside the 
Enterprise 
- Align NAE functions and processes to provide aircraft ready for 
tasking at reduced cost 
- Communicate our vision so that all NAE employees have a sense of 
purpose and clearly understand the meaning of their individual 
contributions to the NAE 
(3)  Achieving Cost-Wise Readiness.  “Cost-wise readiness” is a 
term repeated in nearly every article reviewed for this research, but what exactly does 
cost-wise readiness mean, and what are the paths for achieving cost-wise readiness?  
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Cost-wise readiness can be interpreted as expending maintenance monies in the most 
efficient manner to obtain the highest quality of maintenance services in order to ready 
aircraft for any potential mission.  Essentially, commands must ensure wise decisions are 
made before each dollar is spent, and each expense serves an intended purpose and can be 
fully validated as being necessary toward keeping aircraft ready for surge capabilities.  
Commands must also employ cost-wise techniques in incorporating continuous process 
improvement (CPI) initiatives in maintenance operations and workforce development. 
There are a variety of ways the NAE can achieve cost-wise 
readiness.  The following are paths to achieving cost-wise readiness (CNAF, 2006): 
• Properly manage aircraft RFT requirements (mission and operational)  
• Manage inventory and investments  
• Reduce operating expenses  
• Identify and address interdependencies  
• Manage and reduce variability  
• Identify and manage constraints  
• Create a culture of CPI  
• Revolutionize the business of Naval aviation maintenance 
• Increase velocity of the local off-flight line repair cycle 
• Increase the density of off-flight line repair loop 
• Reduce cycle time to repair 
• Interdict BCM repairs 
 
b. Naval Aviation Readiness Integrated Improvement Program 
(NAVRIIP) 
At about the same time NAPPI stood up; there were also significant 
challenges with Naval aviation material readiness.  In 1998, the Commander-in-Chief, 
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U.S. Pacific Fleet, commissioned a study called Aviation Maintenance Supply Readiness 
(AMSR).  The AMSR study began identifying the root causes of gaps between readiness 
requirements and resources.  It clearly demonstrated that process improvement, based on 
quantifiable metrics and data collection, was critical to understanding the reasons behind 
the significant supply shortfalls that were hampering Naval aviation readiness.  While 
AMSR ventilated the root causes, it lacked a construct for implementation, so in 2001, 
the Naval Aviation Readiness Integrated Improvement Program (NAVRIIP) was created 
(NAF, 2005). 
NAVRIIP is an enabler of the NAE.  Its goal is to determine what 
inventory levels are required to maintain a certain ready to train or operational status and 
matches the right amount of readiness and cost to achieve and sustain those levels.  
NAVRIIP helps understand and to control cost drivers.  It is focused on achieving aircraft 
RFT at a reduced cost which is accomplished by creating a culture of cost-wise readiness 
and CPI (Badertscher, et al., 2005).    
 
B. COST-WISE INITIATIVES 
1. AIRSpeed 
AIRSpeed is NAVRIIP’s architecture for operationalizing cost-wise readiness 
across the NAE.  It is characterized by an integrated culture of self-sustaining, CPI 
aligned toward delivering mission requirements at reduced resource cost thus enabling 
world-class logistics excellence for the NAE in support of the T/M/S teams.  AIRSpeed 
provides the planning, training, integration, sustainment, and monitoring of business 
practices across the NAE (CNAF, 2006).  
There are three AIRSpeed programs that fall under the umbrella of the NAE: 
Depot, Enterprise, and NAVAIR.  Each is designed to employ industry-proven best 
business processes and methodologies to reduce cycle time, improve productivity, and 
establish a culture of continuous improvement.  Depot AIRSpeed focuses on improving 
efficiencies throughout depot production by reducing the cycle time of refurbishing 
aircraft by improving the material management of production processes thus increasing 
productivity at a lower cost.  Enterprise AIRSpeed allows managers to look at the system 
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holistically and enables them to make local decisions.  This initiative focuses on the total 
aviation solution within all levels of supply and maintenance (Badertscher, et al., 2005).  
It is designed to integrate the decision making processes of asset positioning and 
visibility with those of planning and scheduling across the entire logistics and operations 
chain.  Enterprise AIRSpeed is designed to become a self-sustaining program through the 
utilization of the “train the trainer” approach (CNAF, 2005a).  The third initiative, 
NAVAIR AIRSpeed, is a cultural transformation that extends the success realized by 
Depot and Enterprise AIRSpeed to transactional and non-production service 
environments and at every level.  It is the solution to a fundamental need to change the 
way business is conducted at every level: Headquarters, Competency, Program Executive 
Office, Program Manager Air (PMA), Integrated Product Team (IPT), and Business Unit 
(Badertscher, et al., 2005).   
The differences between Depot and Enterprise AIRSpeed are that Enterprise 
AIRSpeed focuses on the total aviation solution at all levels of supply and maintenance, 
whereas Depot AIRSpeed concentrates on the micro level at the aviation depots.  Each of 
these programs integrate best business practices tools of Lean, Theory of Constraints 
(TOC) (basic and advanced), and Six-sigma to transform the repair and replenishment 
process from a “push” to a “pull” system and identifies and manages constraints, 
variability and interdependencies within the system (CNAF, 2006).  
What sets AIRSpeed apart from all other efficiency models, is that it is a 
composite approach that operates under a triad of existing methodologies: TOC, the Lean 
manufacturing process and Six-sigma.  TOC is the overarching architecture applied for 
AIRSpeed.  It allows an organization the ability to identify and focus on the limiting 
variables, or constraints, that have the greatest overall impact on productivity.  TOC 
answers three questions: What to change, what to change into, and how to effect that 
change.  The Lean manufacturing process focuses on identifying and removing waste 
and/or steps that don’t add value to the final product.  Six-sigma reduces variation across 





The terms “lean, lean manufacturing or lean production” can be defined as 
“a systematic approach to identifying and eliminating non-value-added activities (waste) 
through continuous improvement by flowing the product at the pull of the customer in 
pursuit of perfection” (MAMTC, 2006).  By eliminating waste (muda), quality is 
improved, production time is reduced, and cost is reduced.  Lean "tools" include CPI 
(kaizen), "pull" production process (by means of kanban) and mistake-proofing (poka-
yoke) (Apte & Kang, 2006).  
Although the origins of Lean can be traced to the Scientific Management 
principles of Frederic Taylor, and the automobile manufacturing of Henry Ford, the 
modern day principles of Lean Production are embodied in “Just in Time (JIT) System” 
and the “Toyota Production System” (Apte &  Kang, 2006).  Japanese leaders at the 
Toyota Motor Company developed these theories during the Japanese re-building effort 
following the Second World War.  Because Japan was faced with declining human, 
material, and financial resources in their factories, Toyota leaders were forced to find 
new ways to become efficient, lower costs, improve manufacturing practices, and 
minimize the consumption of resources that did not add value to the manufacturing 
process (MAMTC, 2006).  The “Toyota Production System” focused on the reduction of 
eight types of wastes in manufacturing or service processes:  
 
• Overproduction-Making more than what is needed at a specific time  
• Transportation- Moving products farther than is minimally required 
• Waiting-Products waiting on the next production step, or people 
waiting for work  
• Inventory-Having more inventory than is minimally required  
• Motion- People moving or walking more than minimally required 
• Non Value Added Processing  
• Defects-The effort involved in inspecting for and fixing defects 
• Underutilization of people 
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The term “lean production” was later coined by Womack, Jones & Roos in 
their 1990 best seller, The Machine that Changed the World: The Story of Lean 
Production.  The book chronicles the transitions of automobile manufacturing from craft 
production to mass production to lean production.  This publication outlined the five 
requirements of a lean enterprise: 
• Specify value in the eyes of the customer  
• Identify the value stream and eliminate waste  
• Make value flow at the pull of the customer  
• Involve and empower employees  
• Continuously improve in the pursuit of perfection 
At the heart of Lean is the determination of value.  Value is defined as 
form, feature, or function for which a customer is willing to pay.  All other aspects of the 
process that do not add value are deemed waste.  The Lean framework is used as a tool to 
focus resources and energies on producing the value-added features while identifying and 
eliminating non-value added activities.  Processes in Lean are thought of as value 
streams.  Lead-time reduction and the flow of the value streams are the major areas of   
focus in Lean.  Value-stream mapping helps teams understand the flow of material and 
information in creating and delivering the product or services being offered to the 
customer by the organization (Apte & Kang, 2006).  
Lean management is about operating the most efficient and effective 
organization possible, with the least cost and zero waste.  To fully understand this 
concept, managers must understand that a lean organization will produce fundamental 
changes to those found in a traditional organization.  Table 1 is an example of how 





Concept Traditional Organization Lean Organization 
Inventory An asset, as defined by accounting 
terminology 
A waste-ties up capital and 
increases processing lead-time 
Ideal Economic Order 
Quantity & Batch Size 
Very large-run large batch sizes to 
make up for process downtime 
ONE-continuous efforts are made 
to reduce downtime to zero 
People Utilization All people must be busy at all times Because work is performed based 
directly upon customer demand, 
people might not be busy 
Process Utilization Use high-speed processes and run 
them all the time 
Processes need to only be designed 
to keep up with demand 
Work Scheduling Build products to forecast Build products to demand 
Labor Costs Variable Fixed 
Work Groups Traditional (functional) departments Cross-functional teams 
Accounting By traditional Financial Accounting 
Standards Board guidelines 
“Through-put” Accounting 
Quality Inspect/sort work at end of process to 
make sure errors are found 
Processes, products, and services 
are designed to eliminate errors 
Table 1.   Traditional Organization and Lean Organization.   
Source: Jerry Kilpatrick, 2003. Lean Principles. Utah Manufacturing Extension 
Partnership.  
 
In summary, the Lean methodology: 
• Focuses on maximizing process velocity  
• Provides tools for analyzing process flow and delay times at each 
activity in a process 
• Emphasizes Value-stream Mapping which centers on the separation of 
"value-added" from "non-value-added" work with tools to eliminate 
the root causes of non-valued activities and their cost  
• Recognizes and attempts to eliminate eight types of waste/non-value-
added processes 
• Creates workplace organization through the Six S methodology 
(different from Six-sigma) consisting of safety, sort, straighten, 
sustain, shine, and standardize   
• Produces a better workplace through the Toyota principle of "respect 
for humanity" (Apte &  Kang, 2006).   
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Lean concepts are essential in organizing the supply and repair chains.  
Recent Lean concepts implemented on aircraft carriers have proven to be effective in 
increasing the efficiency of maintenance operations and lowering the labor cost for each 
maintenance repair.  Changes created by simply reorganizing maintenance parts has cut 
down the amount of time maintainers use to locate engines from two hours to 45 minutes.  
Another improvement was discovered by mapping the movement of repair crews and 
their equipment during repairs.  This resulted in the decrease of the movement of aircraft 
parts and people by 97 percent and 62 percent, and reduced forklift travel by 75 percent.  
By identifying potential areas for improvement, eliminating unnecessary “muda” in 
operations, and centrally locating critical repair components and equipment in the vicinity 
of its use reduces non-value added steps, boosts productivity, and lessens turn-around 
time (TAT).  
Before AIRSpeed gained in popularity, these types of Lean initiatives just 
didn’t happen quickly, in fact many cost reduction and improvement initiatives met 
“institutional resistance”.  Transformation goals outlined in the Quadrennial Defense 
Review, and CNO policy have forced the hands of bureaucracy to concede to the 
achievement of a cost-wise defense force.  As such, ideas for reducing costs are readily 
introduced from the deck plate, explored for feasibility, and quickly implemented at 
minimal costs.  Monies earned from productivity increases and reduced TAT can be spent 
on the purchase of needed aircraft and spare parts.  Lean production concepts can help to 
achieve these types of outcomes. 
b. Theory of Constraints (TOC) 
The Theory of Constraints (TOC) is a management philosophy and 
business unit strategy created by Dr. Eliyahu M. Goldratt.  It is a particular body of 
knowledge that addresses effective management of various organizations as systems by 
focusing on the constraint or bottleneck in the process.  TOC views organizations as 
systems consisting of resources which are linked by the processes they perform 
(interdependencies).  Inherent in such systems are variability in its processes, suppliers 
and customers.  Within that system, a constraint is defined as any element that restricts 
the flow of the system, consistent with demand; otherwise, its throughput would go to 
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infinity.  A market, vendor, or an internal resource can be a constraint.  The 
interdependencies and variability between and within system processes are similar in 
nature to the structure of a chain.  Just as the strength of a chain is governed by the 
weakest link, TOC maintains that the ability of the organization to achieve its goal is 
governed by a single or very few constraints (Hickey et. al, 2003).   
(1)  Tenets of TOC.  TOC requires a fundamental shift in how an 
organization is viewed, understood, and measured.  TOC eliminates process constraints 
so the workforce can focus on efficient operations.  It is based on the premise that the rate 
of revenue generation is limited by at least one constraining process (i.e. a bottleneck).  
Only by increasing throughput (production rate) at the bottleneck process, can overall 
throughput be increased.  To adequately implement TOC requires a five step focused 
approach in order to pursue ongoing improvement.  These steps include: 
 Identify the system’s constraint 
 Decide how to exploit the system’s constraint 
• Maximize the constraint so throughput is maximized now and in the 
future 
• Figure out what are the market values relative to the industry’s 
current offerings, and align the organization to deliver value as 
solutions to the market’s high value problems 
 Subordinate everything else to the above decision 
• Once the constraint has been identified, do not allow the 
improvement initiatives to interfere with the high priority of the 
above decisions.  Policies, processes or resources must be altered or 
managed in order to support the decision to address the constraint 
 Elevate the systems constraint 
• Generate more sales if market is a constraint 
• Acquire new sources for material (vendor constraint) 
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• Purchase more equipment, hire more employees, reduce setup costs, 
add additional shifts, etc. (internal resource constraint) 
 Decide if the constraint has been broken or has shifted  (if constraint is not 
broken or shows sign of shifting,  return to step 4; if the constraint is 
broken, return to step 1) 
• Don’t allow inertia to become the systems constraints.  When one 
constraint is broken, go back to Step 1 
However, prior to the identification of the constraint, it is 
important to understand the basic facts about the system.  Primarily, it is important to 
know the system and its purpose as well as the measurement of the system’s goal.  TOC 
requires the organization to have clear and concise verbalization of its goals because 
constraints are best identified and dealt with in relation to the system’s objective as 
constraints have the ability to prevent organizations (manufacturing particularly) from 
achieving its goals (Hickey et. al, 2003).  Additionally, TOC measures if an organization 
is meeting its goal (in most cases, the goal of making money).  TOC starts by 
categorizing what a firm does with its money in three ways: 
• Throughput: The rate at which the organization generates money 
through sales 
• Inventory/Investment: All of the money that the organization spends 
on things it intends to turn into throughput 
• Operating Expense: All of the money the organization spends in order 
to turn inventory into throughput 
The challenge and power of allocating all of the money in the 
system into one of three mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive categories lies in 
the improved ability of the organization to evaluate the impact of decisions relative to the 
goal of making money (Hickey et. al, 2003).   
(2)  Operational Elements of TOC.  TOC employs a drum-
buffer-rope (DBR) method in its manufacturing process as a means of improving 
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throughput and increasing net profit.  The drum is the detailed master production 
schedule that emerges when demand is matched with the capabilities of the system’s 
constraints.  The buffer is the protection allotted to the constraints.  This ensures if 
disruptions occur in the manufacturing process, work will still be available to the 
constraint.  Rope synchronizes all resources to the beat of the drum by releasing just the 
right materials into the system in the right quantity, and at the right time (Hickey et al., 
2003).  As such, TOC is essentially a “pull system” that sends material upstream based 
on demand, in this case, the beat of the drum is the gatekeeper for demand.  Simply 
stated, TOC is a key element of the JIT delivery system.   
c. Six-Sigma 
Six-sigma is based on the assumption that the outcome of the entire 
process will be improved by reducing the variation of multiple elements, inputs and sub-
processes (CNAF, 2005a).  The methodology is focused on reducing variation and 
improving process yield by following a problem-solving approach using statistical tools 
to eliminate variation between the goods or services delivered and what the customer 
expects (therefore reduces time spent on rework).  The goal of Six-sigma is  to work 
toward  a  systematic management of  the variation until defects are eliminated from the 
product, and to deliver reliability, performance, and value to the customer on a world-
class level. 
(1)  Six-Sigma Methodology.  There are two key methodologies 
that are involved with Six-sigma.  These are DMAIC and DMADV.  DMAIC is used in 
the improvement of an existing process in an existing business, and DMADV is used to 
create either new process designs or product designs in ways that result in mature, 
predictable, and defect-free performance for the company (Gupta, 2003).   
The basic DMAIC methodology consists of five specific phases.  
These phases include: define, measure, analyze, improve, and control (Gupta, 2003).  It is 
important to define what the goals are when it comes to process improvement and how 
these are consistent with both enterprise strategy and customer demands.  Measure 
involves a baseline of the current processes so that future comparisons can be made.  The 
third phase includes analyzing the relationship between the factors based on causality.  
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The fourth phase includes improving and optimizing the process based on the analysis 
that was created.  The last phase includes controlling the process capability, the 
production transition, and future processes (Gupta, 2003).  It is also important to ensure 
that the changes that have been made are continuously monitored so that future variances 
can be seen and quickly corrected before they are allowed to result in defects (Gupta, 
2003).   
The DMADV methodology also has five phases, but some are 
slightly different from those seen in the other methodologies.  These five phases include: 
Define, measure, analyze, design, and verify (Gupta, 2003).  The define step in DMADV 
is the same as in DMAIC.  It is important to define the activity design and goals as they 
relate to the enterprise strategy and customer demand (Gupta, 2003).  After which, it is 
important to measure the production process capabilities, the product capabilities, the risk 
assessment, and other issues (Gupta, 2003).  Once this has been completed, one must 
analyze the alternatives for design and create or evaluate different design elements until 
one is chosen.  From there, the selected design will be developed in detail, optimized, 
verified, and require simulation tests to be conducted.  The last step is to verify the design 
that was chosen, address some pilot runs, implement the process that was agreed upon, 
and then hand the process over to the owners of the company (Gupta, 2003). 
(2)  Key Roles of Six-Sigma Implementation.  The Six-sigma 
approach, however, cannot just be implemented without a great deal of dedication toward 
the process.  There are five key roles that must be addressed for a Six-sigma approach to 
be successful in its implementation.  These roles include: executive leadership, 
champions, master black belts, black belts, and green belts (Gupta, 2003).   
The first key role, executive leadership, includes not only the Chief 
Executive Officer but other top management as well.  These individuals are responsible 
for the actual development of the vision that they will use for the Six-sigma 
implementation.  These individuals also empower others that have specific roles so that 
they have the resources and the freedom to explore new ideas and make improvements.  
The second key role is that of the champions who are charged with the duty of integrating 
Six-sigma into the organization (Gupta, 2003).  The next level, master black belts, are 
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identified and selected by the champions, and they are in-house experts to coach others 
on Six-sigma (Gupta, 2003).  All of their time is spent on this, and they help assist the 
champions and guide the black belts and the green belts.  In addition to working with 
statistics, they also spend time ensuring that the Six-sigma approach is integrated across 
all departments and functions.  The black belts operate under these individuals to make 
sure that the Six-sigma approach is applied to specific projects (Gupta, 2003).  They also 
devote all of their time to Six-sigma and generally focus most of their attention on the 
project execution.  At the last level, green belts, is standard employees that work on Six-
sigma in addition to the rest of their duties (Gupta, 2003).  They work under the guidance 
of the black belts and they help to support them so that overall results can be achieved.  
There are specific training programs that are utilized to ensure that roles can be properly 
performed (Gupta, 2003).  Overall, much of what is used in Six-sigma is not all that new, 
but the old tools are used together, and a far greater effort is put into them than what has 
been seen in the past.   
d. AIRSpeed Successes 
The AIRSpeed program is the Navy’s implementation of Lean Six-sigma.  
As stated by the Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter, in a memorandum in May 2006, 
“Lean Six-sigma (LSS) is a proven business process that several elements of the Navy 
and Marine Corps have initiated including training over 500 black belts and 1500 green 
belts who have facilitated 2800 events and projects.  These activities have averaged a 4:1 
return on investment (ROI).”  The following examples demonstrate some success stories 
in the implementation of AIRSpeed.  
• In October 2005, Naval Air Warfare Center accounting practices yielded an 
annual savings of $176.9K with an additional anticipated saving of $146.3K 
in waste elimination.  
• Since April 2004, AIMD Whidbey Island reduced J-52 aircraft engine repair 
time from 468 hours to 233 hours and reported significant inventory and 
operating cost savings.   
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• Since February 2006, AIMD Patuxent River has seen increased savings due to 
a 10% inventory reduction and a reallocation of 166 hours of full-time 
employees.  
• In June 2005, NADEP (Naval Aviation Depot) Cherry Point revamped the 
Beneficial Suggestion Program.  The “5 year” process is now encompassed in 
a 30-day turnaround, with all beneficial suggestions being implemented within 
a 30-180-day window.   
• In June 2006, NAVAIR’s PMA offices began replicating successes of other 
PMA offices, including one office that saw an estimated $163K/year savings 
due to reducing processing time from 240 days average to a predicted average 
of 15 days.  Other organizations that have begun AIRSpeed implementation 
involve weapons, training systems, support equipment, safety, test ranges, 
reports, fleet support, and human resources (Apte & Kang, 2006). 
• Cherry Point reduced CH-46 TAT from 215 days to 170. 
• Jacksonville reduced EA-6B re-wing TAT from 594 days to 450. 
• North Island reduced F/A-18 TAT from 192 days to 132, the average Work-
In-Progress (WIP) reduction was 37%   
In these instances, by focusing on four key metrics: inventory, cycle time, 
quality, and total cost; the Enterprise model NAVRIIP/AirSpeed has helped to improved 
all aspects of maintenance from Organization-level through Depot-Level and supply and 
acquisition responsiveness – for the benefit of the warfighter.   
 
2. Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 
Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) is the process the DoD uses to reorganize 
its installation infrastructure to more efficiently and effectively support its forces, 
increase operational readiness and facilitate new ways of doing business.  Public Law 
101-510, “Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990,” as amended, established 
the procedures under which the Secretary of Defense may realign or close military 
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installations inside the United States and its territories.  Congress authorized a BRAC 
2005.  The law authorized the establishment of an independent Commission to review the 
Secretary of Defense recommendations for realigning and closing military installations 
(DODIG, 2005). 
A primary objective of BRAC 2005, in addition to realigning base structure, was 
to examine and implement opportunities for greater Joint activity.  Prior BRAC analyses 
considered all functions on a Service-by-Service basis, and therefore, did not result in the 
Joint examination of functions that cross Services (DODIG, 2005).  The Joint Cross-
Service Groups (JCSG) addressed issues that affect common business-oriented support 
functions, examined functions in the context of facilities, and developed realignment and 
closure recommendations based on force structure plans of the Armed Forces and on the   
selection criteria of three major categories: Military Value, ROI, and Impact.  Table 2 
provides a detailed description of the selection criteria (GAO/NSIAD-95-133, 1995).   
The JCSGs reported their results through the Infrastructure Executive Council and 
the Infrastructure Steering Group.  The Office of the Secretary of Defense established 
seven JCSGs—Education and Training, Headquarters and Support Activities, Industrial, 
Intelligence, Medical, Supply and Storage, and Technical (DODIG, 2005). 
The Industrial JCSG was one of six JCSGs established on 15 March 2003, by the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD (AT&L).  
Later, a seventh JCSG was added.  Each JCSG is responsible for overseeing the Joint 
cross-service analysis of functions within their area (DODIG, 2005).  Specific to this 
research, the analysis and recommendations of the Supply and Storage JCSG (S&S 
JCSG), and the Industrial JCSG will be discussed only.  
During the BRAC 2005 proceedings, the S&S JCSG was chartered to conduct a 
comprehensive review of DoD’s common business-oriented S&S logistics functions.  
Chaired by the Director, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), the Committee proposed the 
consolidation of numerous supply, storage, and distribution functions and associated 
inventories of the Defense Distribution Depots (DD) with other supply, storage and 
distribution functions and inventories that existed at NADEPs; retaining only the 
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minimum necessary supply, storage, distribution functions and inventories required to 
support depot operations, maintenance, and production.  The S&S JCSG further 
recommended that the NADEPs serve as a wholesale Forward Distribution Point, and all 
other wholesale storage and distribution functions and associated inventories be 
transferred to the San Joaquin Strategic Distribution Platform (BRAC, 2005b). 
 
 
Category  Criteria 
Military Value  1. Current and future mission requirements and the impact on operational 
readiness of DoD’s entire force.  
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace 
at both the existing and potential receiving locations.  
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future total 
force requirements at both the existing and potential receiving locations.  





5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the 
number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or 
realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.  
 
Impact   
6. The economic impact on communities.  
7. The ability of both the existing and potential receiving communities’ 
infrastructures to support forces, missions, and personnel.  
8. The environmental impact.  
 
 
Table 2.   DoD Criteria for Selecting Bases for Closure or Realignment.   
Source: GAO Report Military Bases, Analysis of DOD’s 1995 Process and 
Recommendations For Closure and Realignment. 
 
The recommendation proposes to achieve economies and efficiencies that 
enhance the effectiveness of logistics support to operational Joint and expeditionary 
forces.  It reconfigures the Department's wholesale storage and distribution infrastructure 
to improve support to the future force, whether home-based or deployed.  It transforms 
existing logistics processes by creating four continental U.S. support regions, with each 
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having one Strategic Distribution Platform and multiple Forward Distribution Points.  
Each Strategic Distribution Platform will be equipped with state-of-the-art consolidation, 
containerization, and palletization capabilities, and the entire structure will provide for in-
transit cargo visibility and real-time accountability.  Distribution Depots, no longer 
needed for regional supply, will be realigned as Forward Distribution Points and will 
provide dedicated receiving, storing, and issuing functions, solely in support of on-base 
industrial customers such as maintenance depots, shipyards, and air logistics centers.  
Forward Distribution Points will consolidate all supply and storage functions supporting 
industrial activities, to include those internal to depots and shipyards, and those at any 
intermediate levels that may exist.  This consolidation eliminates unnecessary 
redundancies and duplication, and streamlines supply and storage processes (BRAC, 
2005b). 
During the same BRAC period, The USD (AT&L) was appointed to Chair the 
Industrial JCSG.  The purpose of the Industrial JCSG is to identify opportunities for 
consolidation, closure, or downsizing of the DoD Industrial Base.  The scope of the 
Industrial JCSG is composed of three functional areas: maintenance; munitions and 
armaments, formerly named ammunitions and armaments; and ship overhaul and repair, 
formerly named shipyards overhaul and repair (DODIG, 2005).  
 
3. Fleet Readiness Centers (FRC) 
During the BRAC 2005 proceedings, the Maintenance Subgroup, chaired by the 
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Installations, Environment, and 
Logistics), conducted an analysis to determine the feasibility of consolidating NADEPs 
and AIMD functional levels into FRCs (DODIG, 2005).  This evaluation considered the 
consolidation of aircraft maintenance services of 42 Navy and Marine Corps facilities and 
the distribution of their maintenance functions and workload to form six regionally-based 
FRCs.   
Under the proposed FRC regional alignment plan, the maintenance functions of 
AIMDs Norfolk, Oceana, and NAS Corpus Christi; NADEPs Camp Pendleton 
Detachment Oceana, Jacksonville Detachment Norfolk, Jacksonville Detachment 
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Oceana, and Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division Lakehurst (NAWCAD LKE) 
Detachment Norfolk will be consolidated under FRC Mid-Atlantic.  AIMD Atlanta and 
Naval Air Reserve Station New Orleans will consolidate its maintenance functions at a 
FRC satellite in New Orleans, and the AIMD Patuxent River will serve as a second 
Satellite FRC under FRC Mid-Atlantic. 
FRC East will consolidate the NADEP Cherry Point, AIMD Willow Grove, and 
Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron (MALS)-14 Cherry Point functions.  Satellite FRCs 
will be positioned at New River, North Carolina for the NADEP Camp Pendleton 
Detachment New River, MALS-26, and MALS-29 units.  Another satellite will be 
located at Beaufort, South Carolina for the NADEP Jacksonville Detachment Beaufort.  
A FRC “affiliated” site will be established in Quantico for the HMX-1 unit. 
FRC Southeast will include NADEPs Jacksonville and Jacksonville Detachment 
Cecil Field, and AIMDs Brunswick and Jacksonville.  Satellite FRCs will be established 
at Mayport, Florida (consolidating AIMD Mayport, NADEP Jacksonville Detachment 
Mayport, and NAWCAD LKE Detachment Mayport) with an additional satellite at Key 
West, Florida. 
FRC Southwest will integrate the depot maintenance of NADEPs North Island, 
North Island Detachment North Island, and AIMD North Island.  FRC Southwest will 
have four additional satellite facilities: (1) NADEP North Island Detachment Pendleton, 
and MALS-39 will be located at Camp Pendleton, (2) Maintenance at Point Mugu will be 
reorganized under the satellite facility, FRC Point Mugu (3) MALS-13 and NADEP 
North Island Detachment Yuma will be merged at FRC Southwest Site Yuma, Arizona, 
and (4) NADEP North Island Detachment Mirarmar, and MALS-11 and MALS-16 will 
be located at the Miramar FRC site. 
The fifth location, FRC Northwest will optimize the functions of NADEP North 
Island Detachment Whidbey Island.  No satellite facilities have been proposed at this 
time. 
The final consolidation point will be FRC West located in Lemoore.  At this 
facility the maintenance functions of AIMD Lemoore and NADEP North Island 
Detachment Lemoore will be integrated.  Additionally, two satellite locations are 
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planned: one in Fallon, Nevada and another at Fort Worth, Texas.  The Fallon site will 
merge the functions of NADEP North Island Detachment Fallon.  The Fort Worth site 
will serve as a location for the F/A-18 support maintenance from AIMD Atlanta  
and the maintenance of and the Naval Air Reserve, Fort Worth.  Figure 3 shows  




Figure 3.       Fleet Readiness Center Regional Alignment Plan.   
          Source: Chief Naval Air Forces webpage http://www.cnaf.navy.mil, 2006.  
 
The BRAC recommendations supports both DoD and Navy transformation goals 
by reducing the number of maintenance levels and streamlining the way maintenance is 
accomplished with associated significant cost reductions.  It supports the NAE’s  goal of 
transforming to fewer maintenance levels (i.e., from 3 to 2 levels); and it supports the 
NAE’s strategy of positioning maintenance activities closer to Fleet concentrations when 
doing so will result in enhanced effectiveness and efficiency, greater agility, and allows 
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Naval Aviation to achieve the right readiness at the least cost.  This transformation to 
FRCs produces significant reductions in the total cost of maintenance, repair and 
overhaul plus the associated supply system (packaging, handling, storage and 
transportation) as well as repairable inventory stocking levels as a result of reduced total 
repair TATs, reduced transportation, lower spares inventories, less manpower, and more 
highly utilized infrastructure.  It requires integration and collaboration between D-Level 
Civil Service personnel and Military I-Level Sailors and Marines.  (BRAC, 2005a) 
a. FRC Expected Savings 
The overall projected savings from the 2005 BRAC recommendations are 
based on reducing overhead and eliminating civilian and military personnel as 
installations are closed and functions are realigned between installations.  Taken 
individually, the recommendation that the industrial group expects will generate the 
greatest amount of savings is the establishment of the FRCs, which is estimated to 
produce net annual recurring savings of $341 million or 56% of the group’s total net 
annual recurring savings and an estimated 20-year net present value savings of $4.7 
billion or 62% of the group’s estimated total net present value savings.  This realignment 
recommendation differs from the other realignments in that it proposes a significant 
business process reengineering effort to integrate the Navy’s non-deployable, 
intermediate and depot level aircraft maintenance rather than a consolidation or 
realignment of workload.  While the changes proposed would appear to have the potential 
for significant savings, as explained below, some uncertainty exists about the full 
magnitude of the savings estimate for this recommendation because most of the group’s 
projected savings are based on efficiency gains that have yet to be validated.  For 
example, the Industrial JCSG found that over 63% of the estimated net annual recurring 
savings for the FRC recommendation are miscellaneous recurring savings projected to 
accrue from overhead efficiencies, such as reduced repair time and charges, while 12% of 
the annual recurring savings is produced from reductions in military personnel and 24% 
of the savings is derived from reductions in civilian personnel.  These efficiencies are 
expected to be gained from integrating I-Level and D-Level of maintenance and not 
having to ship as many items to faraway depots for repair.  In addition, 34% of the net  
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implementation savings for this recommendation is derived from other one-time unique 
savings accrued from one-time reductions in spare parts inventories (GAO-05-785, 
2005).    
For all FRCs, there is a combined annual facility sustainment savings of 
$1.1M; elimination of a total of 529,000 square feet of depot/intermediate maintenance 
production space and military construction cost avoidances of $0.2M.  This 
recommendation also includes a military construction cost of $85.7M.  (BRAC, 2005a) 
In terms of labor, and assuming no economic recovery, the FRC 
recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of approximately 1,187 
jobs from the regionalization of all FRCs, 697 from East Coast FRCs, and 490 jobs 
between the establishment of FRCs Northwest (NAS Whidbey Island), FRC Southwest 
(Naval Amphibious Base (NAB) Coronado, NAS North Island), and FRC West (NAS 
Lemoore) (Coyle, 2005).  Between calendar years 2006-2011; 104 to 136 direct and 
indirect jobs are expected to be reduced in the Bakersfield, California Metropolitan 
Statistical Area alone.  This number represents less than 0.1 percent of the economic area 
employment in the areas surrounding NAS Lemoore (BRAC, 2005a).  On the other hand, 
26 civilian jobs will be transferred to the FRC West from the realignment of NAB 
Coronado.  Figure 4 provides an overview of the workload reductions and reallocations 





Figure 4.   Reorganization of Naval Air Intermediate and Depot Maintenance Into 
Fleet Readiness Centers (West Coast).   




Although the data collected by BRAC suggests the potential for savings, 
there is some uncertainty regarding the magnitude of the Industrial Group’s expected 
savings for the FRCs because its estimates are based on assumptions that have undergone 
limited testing, and full savings realization depends upon the transformation of the 
Navy’s supply system.  In determining the amount of savings resulting from the 
establishment of the FRCs, the industrial group and the Navy made a series of 
assumptions that focused on combining I-Level and D-Level maintenance in a way that 
would reduce the time an item is being repaired at the I-Level, which in turn, would 
simultaneously reduce the number of items needed to be kept in inventory and the 
number of items sent to a depot for repair.  These assumptions, which were the major 
determinant of realignment savings, were based on historical data and pilot projects, and 
were not been independently reviewed by the Industrial JCSG, BRAC, Naval Audit 
Service, or DoD Inspector General.   
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How well the FRC concept is implemented will be the key to determining 
the amount of savings realized.  Based on the Industrial JCSG analysis, two types of 
savings account for the majority of the projected savings from the FRC recommendation.  
First, one-time savings are projected to accrue from reductions in inventory maintained at 
several Navy shore locations because item repair cycle time for components is reduced 
with more D-Level maintenance being performed at or near the Fleet, generally at an 
intermediate facility.  This reduction is accomplished by stationing several D-Level repair 
personnel at an intermediate facility to assist in repairing an item on site rather that 
spending time re-packing and shipping the item to a depot for repair.  By reducing the 
TAT for an item—i.e. time spent in transit to and from a depot level repair facility, it is 
estimated that the average time an item is in the repair pipeline will decrease from 28 
hours to 9 hours, with nearly all that time spent on the actual repair.  This reduction in 
TAT will allow for savings since fewer items will need to be kept in the shore based 
aviation consolidated inventory because items will be getting repaired quicker and 
returned to the inventory faster.   
The second type of savings is recurring overhead savings that are 
projected to accrue from fewer items being sent to depots for repair.  Establishing FRCs 
will reduce depot repairs, thus reducing per item maintenance costs.  When an item is 
sent to a depot, two charges are applied to the cost to repair the item; a component unit 
price and a cost recovery rate.  If fewer items are sent to a depot, then fewer repair 
charges are incurred and less overhead costs are incurred.  However, since the depots will 
have fewer items to repair, they will have fewer opportunities to generate revenue to 
support their working capital fund operations.  This situation could create an incentive for 
the depot to increase its cost recovery rate for items it does repair to make up for reduced 
revenues.  If this were to occur, then the projected savings would not materialize because 
most of the FRC savings are based on a reduction in the number of items sent to depots 
and are contingent on the supply system not drastically raising the cost recovery rate.  
In an effort to reduce these assumptions, an important step in this 
transformation effort required DoD to follow through with eliminating management 
structures and duplicate layers of inventory in the supply system.  The S&S JCSG 
recommendations to realign supply, storage, and distribution management is expected to 
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further the FRC transformation by eliminating unnecessary redundancies and duplication 
and by streamlining supply and storage processes, which will reduce costs and help 
prevent a large increase in the cost recovery rate.  
Another assumption is that the workload distribution between the 
government and contractor establishments will be properly accounted for and recorded.  
This area bears an enormous amount of risk in properly accounting for depot level work 
to meet legislatively mandated reporting requirements on the percentage of depot 
workload performed in government and contractor facilities, absent efforts to ensure 
adequate differentiation of work completed for I-Level and D-Level maintenance.  
Similar difficulties occurred in 2001 with the consolidation of I-Level and D-Level work 
at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, Hawaii.  Prior to consolidation, the Navy’s 
determination of I-Level and D-Level maintenance work was based on which facility 
performed it; the former Pearl Harbor shipyard performed depot work, and the former 
intermediate maintenance facility performed intermediate work.  Because Pacific Fleet 
and Pearl Harbor officials asserted that all work was considered and classified the same at 
the consolidated facility, the management and financial systems did not differentiate 
between depot and intermediate categories of work.  As a result, the lines between what 
was considered intermediate and depot maintenance became blurred, making it harder to 
report what was I-Level and D-Level maintenance workload.  
The remedy proposed during the first few years of implementing the FRCs 
is for the Navy to continue to operate depot maintenance within the working capital fund 
(setting up a separate holding account) and perform intermediate maintenance with 
mission funding (O&M).  During this period, D-Level maintenance will be reported as D-
Level maintenance and I-Level maintenance will be reported as I-Level maintenance.  
While this should mitigate the accounting issue in the short-term, it is unclear to what 
extent longer term measures will be needed to ensure proper reporting of depot work to 
meet statutory requirements (GAO-05-785, 2005). 
Based on the expected efficiencies, benefits, savings, ROI, and known 
risks, in 2005, DoD issued the final FRC recommendations to the BRAC (BRAC, 2005a).  
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Listed below are the recommendations that will impact the aviation maintenance 
functions at the Naval Air Station, Lemoore:  
Realign Naval Air Station Lemoore, CA, by disestablishing Aircraft 
Intermediate Maintenance Department Lemoore and Naval Air Depot 
North Island Detachment; establishing Fleet Readiness Center West, 
Naval Air Station Lemoore, CA; and transferring all intermediate and 
depot maintenance workload and capacity to Fleet Readiness Center West, 
Naval Air Station Lemoore, CA. 
Realign Naval Air Station Fallon, NV, by disestablishing the Aircraft 
Intermediate Maintenance Department Fallon and the Naval Air Depot 
North Island Detachment Fallon; establishing Fleet Readiness Center West 
Site Fallon, Naval Air Station Fallon, NV; and transferring all 
intermediate and depot maintenance workload and capacity to Fleet 
Readiness Center West Site Fallon, Naval Air Station Fallon, NV. 
Realign Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division China Lake, CA, by 
disestablishing the Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department and 
relocating its maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft 
(approximately 3 K DLHs), Aircraft Components (approximately 45 K 
DLHs), Fabrication & Manufacturing (approximately 6 K DLHs) and 
Support Equipment (approximately 16 K DLHs) to Fleet Readiness Center 
West, Naval Air Station Lemoore, CA.   
Realign Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth, TX, by 
disestablishing the Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department, 
establishing Fleet Readiness Center West Site Fort Worth, Naval Air 
Station Fort Worth, TX, and transferring all intermediate maintenance 
workload and capacity to Fleet Readiness Center West Site Fort Worth, 
Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth, TX. 
The existing intermediate level activity associated with HMX-1 at MCB 
Quantico, VA, will also be affiliated with FRC East.  FRC Southeast will 
be located on NAS Jacksonville, FL, and will have an affiliated FRC Site 
at NAS Mayport, FL. FRC West will be located on NAS Lemoore, CA, 
and will have FRC affiliated sites at NAS JRB Fort Worth, TX, and NAS 
Fallon, NV.  FRC Southwest will be located on Naval Station Coronado, 
CA, and will have affiliated sites at MCAS Miramar, CA, MCAS 
Pendleton, CA, MCAS Yuma, AZ, and NAS Point Mugu, CA. FRC 




The consolidation of I-Level and D-Level Maintenance functions at NAS 
Lemoore is estimated to cost DoD a one time implementation charge of $298.1M.  The 
net of all costs and savings to the Department during the implementation period is a 
savings of $1,528.2M annual recurring savings to the Department after implementation 
the savings will be $341.2M with a payback expected immediately.  The net present 
value of the costs and savings to the Department over 20 years is a savings of $4,724.2M 
(BRAC, 2005a). 
c. FRC Implementation 
The NAE is well on its way toward implementing the FRC concept to 
transform aircraft maintenance facilities.  In February 2006, the NAE Board of Directors 
approved the concept of operations developed by NAVAIR’s Commander for Aviation 
Depots to implement BRAC 2005 decisions to establish FRCs.  Under this plan the FRCs 
will report to the Commander, Naval Air Forces (Taormina, 2006).  
BRAC’s recommendation was essentially a Navy business process  
reengineering effort to transform the way the Navy conducts aircraft maintenance by 
integrating existing shore-based (non-deployable) off flight-line intermediate and depot 
maintenance levels into a single, seamless maintenance level.  The FRC construct focuses 
on the philosophy that some depot level maintenance actions are best accomplished at or 
near the operational fleet (GAO-05-785, 2005).     
The expectation remains that decreased TATs for aircraft maintenance 
will improve the Navy’s ability to maintain the right level of combat-ready aircraft at 
reduced costs.  On 1 August 2006, the Office of the Secretary of Defense approved the 
FRC business plan (Taormina, 2006).  On 10 October 2006, the first FRC  
(FRC Southwest) was opened at NAB Coronado, (NAS North Island), CA.  The planned 
completion and realignment of all resources for the FRC transition is scheduled for FY09.   
The implementation of FRCs is one of the Navy’s strategies to support the 
warfighter and achieve cost-wise readiness in the 21st Century.  The establishment of 
FRCs complements NAE initiatives to achieve cost-wise readiness by making significant 
changes to the way the Navy and Marine Corps manage repairs across all levels of 
aviation maintenance.  By using Enterprise AIRSpeed tools, the business of Naval 
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Aviation will migrate to a new level of cost-wise readiness steering toward entitlements 
based on operational requirements.  According to Rear Admiral Hardee,  Commander, 
Fleet Readiness Center, the FRC concept is “[E]mbarking on the most significant and 
aggressive transformation in Naval aviation maintenance in decades; partnering up our 
military and civilian maintainers to create these centers creates the kind of  “all star” team 
[N]aval aviation needs for greater efficiency, agility, and velocity of operations.”  Private 
sector partners are bringing additional workload and investment to the FRCs due to its 
proven track record of being a reliable and cost effective producer (Taormina, 2006.) 
d. FRC Contributions Towards Achieving Cost Readiness 
FRCs seek to achieve “cost-wiseness” by lowering the cost to the Fleet for 
repairing expensive AVDLRs; reducing repair TAT and the amount of inventory needed; 
and by eventually allowing a significant cost-avoidance through careful reductions in the 
number of spare parts required to maintain the required number of ready for issue (RFI) 
spares on the shelves. 
A fundamental tenet of the FRC concept is the alteration of the traditional 
repair cycle whenever possible and practical.  The FRC enables the BCM interdiction 
concept when or “if and only if” it makes sense.  In some selected cases, the NAE may 
elect to “repair in place”, rather than ship broken/inoperable components from former I-
Levels to “not-on-site” former depots through the supply system.  In other cases the NAE 
may elect to consolidate repair capacities and capabilities at selected places when it 
makes the best sense.  “If and only if” it makes more sense to expeditiously and 
efficiently do repairs at centralized locations, then that approach may be taken.  This will 
significantly lower “Total Repair Cycle-time” thus driving down costs.  In FY03, the 
Fleet spent approximately $2.5 billion on aviation repairables.  The FRC also achieves 
substantial “cost-wiseness” and savings through (CNAF, 2006a): 
• The BCM interdiction concept.  This provides a significant reduction in AVDLR 
costs to the Fleet, as repairs will be accomplished in-place to the maximum extent 
possible.  This reduces costs associated with sending repairables off-station for 
repair.  D-Level civilian artisans will work side by side with intermediate-level 
technicians. 
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• Fixing more components at the new FRCs (including former depots) will result in 
fewer components being BCM’d to other sites.    
• The consolidation and closing of a limited number of active duty and reserve 
intermediate-levels, but only in those instances where operational fleet basing 
changes negate the need for resident I-Levels (FRC sites).  
• Providing the potential for a substantial cost-avoidance in the shore consolidated 
allowance list (required spares) inventory in the future.  This comes about through 
needing less buffer inventory as components are repaired faster and cheaper, and 
through smaller replacement buys for the spares inventory replacements.  
• Personnel reductions accomplished through normal attrition and/or re-alignment 
over a period of several years.  If realignment occurs, cost-wiseness is expected to 
occur by retaining knowledgeable workers and cross-training then into related 
fields.   
Although no comparable data is yet available, the success of the FRCs will 
ultimately be measured in terms of the impact on total ownership costs.  Fleet-driven 
metrics will be used to monitor the impact of the FRC process at all sites.  FRCs are 
being implemented within Naval Aviation’s existing resources to reduce total ownership 
costs across the life cycle of affected equipment.  Since manpower and material are 
principle cost drivers at every level of maintenance, workload and material requirements 
will not be shifted from one level to another unless there is clearly a positive effect on 
total ownership costs. 
Annualized availability and cost metrics will be projected and tracked 
against baseline data.  To evaluate the progress and estimate the impact of FRCs, a 
common metrics framework is currently being developed by subject matter experts.  
Additionally, in order to provide a definitive basis for decision-making, each FRC site 
will develop a detailed analysis of the long-term cost/benefits and a realistic assessment 
of associated risks.  Through this documentation process, FRC savings can be assessed 
and the true impact of the FRCs can be made (CNAF, 2006a).  
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e. Value-Added Principles 
Another strategy is that the consolidation of depot and intermediate levels 
of maintenance will add value to maintenance activities across the entire NAE by 
decreasing costs, increasing the knowledge base of maintenance personnel, and 
improving readiness.  This is in line with the NAE CFT concept.  In the end, the FRC 
will eliminate task duplication and repeated troubleshooting, reduce material 
requirements, reduce the number of work in progress repairables, and improve the 
feedback loop process.  
(1)  FRC Value to People.  On the shop floor, FRCs precisely 
place Civil Service artisans shoulder-to-shoulder with their Military Sailor and Marine 
maintainer counterparts to optimize readiness, efficiency, and reliability through a more 
seamless collaboration of activities.  This initiative will result in the following: 
• Better training and professional development  
• Opportunities to support the next generation of aircraft  
• A more satisfying and rewarding place to work 
(2)  FRC Value to Cost.  Money is saved by reducing the number 
of BCM activities moving from intermediate to depot levels.  With depot expertise closer 
to the intermediate level technicians, FRCs will fix it once, fit it right, and fix it on time.  
The expected outcome includes: 
• Reduction of rework  
• Less time and money spent on non-value added activities (e.g., shipping, 
packing, storage, transportation)  
• Cost savings help the Navy afford both current and future readiness  
(3)  FRC Value to Readiness Collaboration of depot and 
intermediate maintenance allows FRCs to transfer knowledge more easily, share 




• Faster TATs 
• Less WIP  
• Improved reliability  
• Increased T/M/S focus (CNAF, 2006b) 
 
4. Virtual Systems Commands (Virtual SYSCOM) 
Cost-wise readiness is also achieved through the initiative of a “Virtual 
SYSCOM”, a system of shared goals and integrated operational concepts: a codified 
method that enables different Naval commands to work together to identify redundant 
processes and achieve numerous efficiencies in overall business management.  
Originating in 2003, leadership from Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), Naval 
Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command 
(SPAWAR), and Naval Supply System Command (NAVSUP) came together to identify 
redundant processes and achieve numerous efficiencies in overall business management 
in support of the CNO’s Sea Enterprise and Sea Power 21 goals and objectives.  They are 
able to better collaborate in order to achieve cost-wise, integrated business and technical 
practices to better support the Navy.  Since 2004, the concept has broadened, as cross-
functional SYSCOM teams and “functional communities” were charged with examining 
their collective effectiveness, reducing their cost of doing business, and integrating their 
capabilities in a more seamless manner to better serve the warfighter.  According to Rear 
Admiral Stone, Commander, NAVSUP, “the Virtual SYSCOM provides a consistent 
broad base of cost, technical, and programmatic support for shaping Navy investments 
that transcends individual commands and programs.  The Virtual SYSCOM itself will be 
a COE as it becomes a clearinghouse for sharing and promoting information on cross-
SYSCOM efficiencies and best practices” (Stone, 2005). 
 
5. Public-Privatization Partnerships 
A public-private partnership for depot maintenance is an agreement between an 
organic depot maintenance activity and one or more private industry, or other entities to 
perform work or utilize facilities and equipment.  Program offices, inventory control 
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points, and materiel/systems/logistics commands may also be parties to such agreements 
or be designated to act on behalf of organic depot maintenance activities.  In general, 
depot maintenance public-private partnering arrangements include (but are not restricted 
to) one or more of the following forms (ADUSD (L&MR), 2002): 
• Use of public sector facilities, equipment, and employees to perform work or 
produce goods for the private sector under certain defined circumstances 
• Private sector use of public sector equipment and facilities to perform work 
for the public sector 
• Work-sharing agreements, using public and private sector facilities and/or 
employees 
The concept of public-privatization partnerships can help Naval Aviation to be 
wiser stewards of government funds.  The idea for partnering with commercial activities 
is not one that just suddenly appeared out of Defense transformation discussions; rather it 
is a strategy that has been around for some time.  In fact the Navy once engaged in public 
and privatization competition in the early 1990s and as such, benefited from this practice 
until terminating the process in 1994.  A specific example of competition at its best 
occurred during the early 1990s as NADEP Norfolk vied for the F-14 overhaul contract.  
The competition motivated the NADEP to streamline overhead, improve work processes, 
reduce labor and material requirements, and implement other cost-saving initiatives in 
order to submit the lowest possible bids.  Process improvement initiatives encouraged 
NADEP Norfolk to carefully evaluate the maintenance specifications to ensure that they 
would only perform required repair work and eliminate unnecessary tasks.  Each required 
task was closely evaluated to ensure that the most efficient process was used to 
accomplish the work.  In addition, new staffing requirements were developed from the 
bottom up to ensure that only the minimum numbers of people with the correct skill 
levels were assigned to the repair process.  As a result of the competition for the F-14 
overhaul, the Norfolk NADEP went from a two-shift operation to a one-shift operation 
and reduced the number of personnel assigned to the program.  In this process, Norfolk 
reduced the F-14 production staff by over 100 people.  They also made other changes to 
increase cost awareness and control.  For example, the numbers of cost centers were 
increased to provide better visibility of production overhead costs and cost center 
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managers were made responsible for controlling these costs.  General overhead costs also 
were reviewed to eliminate unnecessary expenses. 
Another example surrounds the public-private competition for F/A-18 work 
between NADEP North Island and Air Force.  In preparation for this competition, 
NADEP did a detailed review of the F/A-18 repair operations with a view to reduce costs.  
One of the changes adopted reduced labor and processing time by moving work crews 
closer to each aircraft as work progressed instead of physically moving the aircraft to 
different work stations.  Other cost saving changes included establishing central approval 
authority for recommended repair tasks, having daily progress meetings between the 
managers and artisans at the site of each aircraft in the plant, and reducing component 
repair time by only repairing the items needed for safe operation instead of completely 
overhauling the entire component. 
In both cases, the measures adopted by NADEPs in response to competition 
caused the depots to become more businesslike, with an increased focus on efficiency and 
bottom-line results.  Similarly, public-private competition also provided an increased 
incentive for private companies to minimize their bids in order to win competed 
workload.  As a result, the officials stated that public-private competition helped to 
ensure that maintenance work was performed by the activity, public or private, that 
provided the best value to the government.  
Performing a public-private competition was difficult, time-consuming and 
resource intensive.  As a result, few competitions were completed before DoD’s 
termination of the program in 1994 (GAO/NSIAD-96-30, 1996).  Though the practice 
was terminated, Naval Aviation learned valuable lessons of becoming an efficient 
organization, and had experienced the first glimpse into the notion of public-privatization 
and the movement toward “cost-wiseness”. 
So it is with irony that on 30 January 2002, The Deputy Under Secretary of 
Defense for Logistics and Material Readiness (DUSD (L&MR) issued a policy letter to 
the Military Secretaries outlining DoD’s policy to use public-private partnerships for 
depot maintenance.  This outsourcing tactic closely parallels the initiative that was 
terminated in 1994.  Specifically, the letter stated, “[T]he Military Departments shall 
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shape partnership agreements to support DoD and Defense-related workloads.  
Partnerships can improve the utilization of DoD facilities, equipment, and personnel.  
Partnerships can bring a wide variety of additional benefits to the parties involved in the 
agreement, and also foster improved support to the warfighter” (ADUSD (L&MR), 
2002). 
To recognize the core competencies of depot maintenance activities, the policy 
letter mandates that that each Military Department designate its depot maintenance 
activities as Centers of Industrial and Technical Excellence (CITE).  (SECNAV, 2002).  
As such, depot maintenance public-private partnerships are formed around these 
identified core competencies.  In a July 2002 memorandum to NAVAIR, NAVSEA, 
SPAWAR, and the Marine Corps Systems Command, the Secretary of the Navy formally 
designated Navy and Marine Corps depot maintenance facilities as CITE (SECNAV, 
2002). 
 
6. Performance Based Logistics (PBL) 
Logistics support has traditionally provided the supply, repair, and maintenance of 
items necessary for the proper operation of a system using an organizational, 
intermediate, and depot maintenance philosophy.  The DoD is promoting the use of 
Performance Based Logistics (PBL) as a cost effective alternative to traditional logistics 
support.  
PBL is the purchase of support as an integrated, affordable, performance package 
designed to optimize system readiness and meet performance goals for a weapons system 
through long-term support arrangements with clear lines of authority and responsibility 
(DAU, 2006).  PBL can help program managers (PM) optimize performance and cost 
objectives through the strategic implementation of varying degrees of Government-
Industry partnerships.   
PBL is DoD’s preferred approach for product support implementation (DAU, 
2005).  Product support is defined as a package of logistics support functions necessary to 
maintain the readiness and operational capability of a system or subsystem.  PBL utilizes 
a performance based acquisition strategy that is developed, refined, and implemented 
55 
during the systems acquisition process for new programs or as a result of an assessment 
of performance and support alternatives for fielded systems.  PBL is a means of 
procuring performance by capitalizing on integrated logistics chains and public/private 
partnerships.  The cornerstone of PBL is the purchase of weapons system sustainment as 
an affordable, integrated (DAU, 2006a).  
The essence of PBL is buying performance outcomes [weapons system 
availability rather than input measures], the individual parts, and repair actions.  Simply 
put, performance based strategies buy outcomes, not products or services (DAU, 2005).  
This is accomplished through a business relationship that is structured to meet the 
warfighter's requirements.  
DoD policy states that “PMs shall develop and implement PBL strategies that 
optimize total system availability while minimizing cost and logistics footprint… 
sustainment strategies shall include the best use of public and private sector capabilities 
through Government/industry partnering initiatives, in accordance with statutory 
requirements” (DAU, 2006a).   
One of the most significant aspects of PBL is the concept of a negotiated 
agreement between the major stakeholders (e.g. the PM, the operational force provider—
the unit, and the support provider(s)—contractor or DLA) that formally documents the 
performance and support expectations, and commensurate resources, to achieve the 
desired PBL outcomes.  DoD Instruction 5000.2 states, "[t]he PM shall work with the 
users to document performance and support requirements/strategies in performance 
agreements specifying objective outcomes, measures, resource commitments, and 
stakeholder responsibilities” (DAU, 2006a).  On the other hand, Military Services shall 
document sustainment procedures that ensure integrated combat support. 
PBL support strategies integrate responsibility for system support in the Product 
Support Integrator (PSI) who manages all sources of support.  A PSI is an entity 
performing as a formally bound agent charged with integrating all sources of support, 
public and private, defined within the scope of the PBL to achieve the documented 
outcomes.  A PSI can be: The system's OEM  or prime contractor, a DoD Component 
organization or command, or a third-party logistics company.  Source of support 
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decisions for PBL do not favor either organic (government) or commercial providers.  
The decision is based upon a best-value determination, evidenced through a business case 
analysis (BCA), of the provider's product support capability to meet set performance 
objectives.  The BCA assesses the best mix of public and private capabilities, 
infrastructure, skills base, past performance, and proven capabilities to meet set 
performance objectives.  This major shift, from the traditional approach of transaction-
based purchasing to product support, emphasizes what level of support program manager 
teams buy, not who they buy from.  Instead of buying set levels of spares, repairs, tools, 
and data, the new focus is on buying a predetermined level of availability to meet the 
warfighter's objectives.  This is a fundamental and significant change, in that it transitions 
the responsibility and corresponding risk for making support decisions to the PSI (DAU, 
2006a). 
a. Metrics 
A key component of any PBL implementation is the establishment of 
metrics.  Since the purpose of PBL is ‘buying performance,’ what constitutes 
performance must be defined in a manner in which the achievement of performance can 
be tracked, measured, and assessed.  The identification of top-level metrics achieves this 
objective.  The PM works with the end user/warfighter to establish system performance 
needs and then works with the product support providers to fulfill those needs through 
documentation of the requirements (including appropriate metrics) in Performance Based 
Agreements (PBAs).  An effective PBL implementation depends on metrics that 
accurately reflect the user’s needs and can be an effective measure of the support 
provider’s performance.  
Linking metrics to existing warfighter measures of performance and 
reporting systems is preferable.  Many existing logistics and financial metrics can be 
related to top-level warfighter performance outcomes (DAU, 2005).  Although actual 
PBL strategies may delineate metrics at levels lower than the warfighter top-level 
measures (e.g., system availability), the initial identification of performance outcomes 
should be consistent with the five key top-level metric areas outlined in the USD (AT&L) 
memorandum of 16 August 2004 titled: “Performance Based Logistics: Purchasing Using 
Performance Based Criteria.”  These PBL top-level metric objectives are as follows: 
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• Operational Availability   
• Operational Reliability 
• Cost per Unit Usage 
• Logistics Footprint 
• Logistics Response Time 
 
Each of the performance outcomes are defined in detail in Table 3, a 
sample listing of performance requirements and metrics which NAVAIR uses for 
tailoring and inclusion into PBL agreements. 
In his 2004 memorandum, the Secretary also indicated the preferred PBL 
contracting approach is the use of long-term contracts with incentives tied to 
performance.  Specific highlights of the policy included: 
• Award term contracts should be used where possible to incentivize optimal 
industry support.  
• Incentives should be tied to metrics tailored by the Military Departments to reflect 
their specific definitions and reporting processes.  
• Award and incentive contracts shall include tailored cost reporting to enable 
appropriate contract management and to facilitate future cost estimating and price 
analysis. 
• PBL contracts must include a definition of metrics and should be constructed to 
provide industry with a firm period of performance.  
• Wherever possible, PBL contracts should be fixed price (e.g., fixed price per 
operating or system operating hour) (USD (AT&L), 2004).  Fixed-price contracts 
are generally appropriate for services that can be defined objectively and for 
which the risk of performance is manageable (GAO-02-1049, 2002). 
• Lack of data on systems performance or maintenance costs, or other pricing risk 
factors may necessitate cost-type contracts for some early stage PBLs.  






• Operational Availability (Ao): The percent of 
time that a system is available for a mission or 
the ability to sustain operations tempo. 
 
 
• (Ao)- (Under Full CLS Only) 
• Readiness 
• Mission Capable Rates 
• Sortie Generation Rate 
• Turn- Around-Times 
• Surge Requirements 
• Reduced Down Time 
 
• Operational Reliability: The measure of a 
system in meeting mission success objectives 
(percent of objectives met, by system).  
Depending on the system, a mission objective 
could be a sortie, tour, launch, destination 
reached, or other service- and system-specific 
metric. 
 
• Sortie Mission Completions 
• Time On Wing 
• Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) 
• MTBF Improvement 
• No Fault Found Reduction Elimination 
 
• Cost Per Unit Usage: The total operating cost 
divided by the appropriate unit of measurement 
for a given system.  Depending on the system, 
the measurement unit could be flight hour, 
steaming hour, launch, mile driven, or other 
service- and system-specific metric. 
 
• Cost Per Flight Hour 
• Annual FFP Cost (prorated by units) 
• Obsolescence Management 
• Attrition Replacement 
• Sustaining Engineering ECP Costs 
• Total Ownership Cost (TOC) 
  
• Logistics Footprint: The Government/ 
contractor size or presence of deployed 
logistics support required to deploy, sustain, 
and move a system.  Measurable elements 
include inventory/equipment, personnel, 
facilities, transportation assets, and real estate. 
 
• Maintenance Planning 
• Reliability improvement 
• Reduced Cannibalizations 
• Support 
Equipment/Training/Publications 
• Inventory Needs 
• Staffing Levels 
 
• Logistics Response Time: The period of time 
from logistics demand signal sent to 
satisfaction of that logistics demand.  
‘Logistics demand’ refers to systems, 
components, or resources (including labor) 
required for system logistics support.   
• Parts Availability 
• First Pass Effectiveness 
• Maintainability 
• P,H,S&T 
• Mean Logistics Down Time 
• Supply Chain Management 
 
Table 3.   NAVAIR Performance Outcomes and Metrics.   
Source: NAVAIRINST 4081.2A.  Policy Guidance for Performance Based Logistics 
Candidates. 
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• PBL contracts should be competitively sourced wherever possible and should 
make maximum use of small and disadvantaged sources.  
• PBL contractors should be encouraged to use small and disadvantaged 
businesses as subcontractors, and may be incentivized to do so through PBL 
contractual incentives tied to small and disadvantaged business subcontracting 
goals.  
b. Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Requirements 
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), part 37.6 defines 
performance-based contracting as structuring all aspects of an acquisition around the 
purpose of the work to be performed with the contract requirements set forth in clear, 
specific, and objective terms with measurable outcomes as opposed to either the manner 
by which the work is to be performed or broad and imprecise statements of work. 
In prescribing policies and procedures for use of performance-based 
contracting methods, the FAR states that such methods are intended to ensure that 
required performance quality levels are achieved and that total payment is related to the 
degree that services performed meet contract standards (GAO-02-1049, 2002).  The FAR 
requires performance-based contracts to: 
• Describe the requirements in terms of results required rather than the methods 
of performance of the work 
• Use measurable performance standards (i.e. terms of quality, timeliness, 
quantity, etc.) and quality assurance surveillance plans 
• Specify procedures for reductions of fee or for reductions to the price of a 
fixed-price contract when services are not performed or do not meet contract 
requirements 
• Include performance incentives where appropriate 
The FAR further addresses elements of performance-based contracting; 
specifically statements of work, quality assurance, and contract type.  The FAR specifies 
that in preparing statements of work, agencies shall, to the maximum extent practicable, 
(GAO-02-1049, 2002): 
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• Describe the work in terms of “what” is to be the required output rather than 
either “how” the work is to be accomplished or the number of hours to be 
provided 
• Enable assessment of work performance against measurable performance 
standards 
• Rely on the use of measurable performance standards and financial incentives 
to encourage competitors to develop and institute innovative and cost-
effective methods of performing the work, and 
• Avoid combining requirements into a single acquisition that is too broad for 
the agency or a prospective contractor to manage effectively. 
 
c. NAVAIR PBL Program 
DoD Directive 5000.1 and 5000.2 directs acquisition managers to consider 
and use performance-based strategies for acquiring and sustaining products and services 
whenever feasible, and further directs program managers to develop and implement PBL 
strategies that optimize total system availability while minimizing cost and logistics 
footprint.  PBL realization seeks to achieve the following: 
 
 Procure an outcome (stated as a level of performance) rather than specific 
products or services 
 Incentivize the provider by linking payment to actual performance.  Incentives 
may include firm fixed type contracts, extended contract periods, and monetary 
incentives.  It also provides program stability, which allows providers to make 
long term commitments resulting in cost savings to both the contractor and the 
Navy 
 Implement realistic, easily understood performance metrics.  Performance metrics 
for PBLs will be stated in terms of readiness, availability, reliability, etc. 
 Tell the provider what the Government wants instead of how to do it.  However, 
the Government reserves the right to direct engineering changes, when necessary.  
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NAVAIR will generally issue a Statement of Objectives (SOO) for the PBL that 
provides top-level program objectives and allows providers maximum flexibility 
in tailoring and proposing an innovative and cost effective Statement of Work 
(SOW) to satisfy the SOO requirements 
 Empower the provider with the authorization and responsibility to control those 
elements required to successfully support the program.  The following are 
examples of the functions that may be delegated to the provider: 
o Obsolescence Management 
o Public Private Partnerships 
o Requirements Determination and Acquisition 
o Packaging, Handling, Storage and Transportation (PHST) 
o Warehousing 
o Engineering and Technical Services 
o Technology Insertion 
o Configuration Management 
o Retrograde Management 
o Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Support (if applicable) 
 Reduce the logistics footprint 
 Have minimal or no impact to the Fleet.  This means the PBL is essentially 
transparent, posing no additional tasking on Fleet maintainers and no additional 
impact to any other product support elements 
 Mitigate long term risk by ensuring exit provisions are included in the 
contract/agreement to facilitate the re-establishment of organic or commercial 
support capability, if needed (NAVAIR, 2004)  
(1)  PBL Candidate Analysis.  In keeping with the above 
regulations, goals, and expectations, NAVAIR evaluates potential PBL candidates by 
completing a PBL Candidate Analysis, also referred to as a Cost Benefit Analysis.  The 
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function of PBL Candidate Analysis is to identify the requirements and compare the costs 
associated with two different product support strategies (PBL and traditional).  It includes 
the additional tasks of assessing core impact on requirements and recommending an 
acquisition strategy. 
PBL Candidate Analysis progress is assessed in conjunction with 
formal program reviews.  This assessment is used to determine the probability of a PBL 
strategy meeting established performance requirements while achieving cost goals.  
Results are used to adjust the PBL strategy (including performance and cost goals) to 
ensure maximum value is achieved. 
The PBL Candidate Analysis is composed of a Core Analysis and 
Determination and two interdependent analyses; the Operational Analysis and Results 
Recommendation, and the Business Analysis and Results Recommendation.  The 
successful conduct of the last two analyses is essential in determining the most cost-
effective support (PBL or traditional) and as justification for the final approval of the 
PBL candidate.  The PBL BCA process is outlined in NAVAIRINST 4081.2A, but for 
brevity is described here.  Figure 5 is a process flow chart of the NAVAIR PBL process. 
The Core Analysis is in response to statutory requirements 
contained in Title 10 U.S.C. Section 2464 and the DoD Core Methodology.  The analysis 
ascertains those capabilities and depot-level workload that must be maintained in public 
facilities to fulfill JCS strategic and contingency plans.  Ideally, the preliminary Core 
Analysis is conducted prior to Milestone B to serve as an advisory to PMs as well as 
influence early depot maintenance planning efforts.  A final Core Analysis is completed 
when definitive information regarding all depot-level repairables becomes available. 
The Core Analysis results are sent to the program office, NAVICP, 
and the candidate organic depot.  The results may also be provided to other recipients as 
needed to determine, support, and execute the PBL candidate’s support strategy.  If the 
workload is required to sustain core capability, a PBL incorporating a partnering 
arrangement between the provider and an organic depot must be considered.  If the 
workload is not required to sustain core capability, a “best value” provider is sought. 
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The Operational Analysis is a detailed examination of the 
performance requirements and it identifies or develops the metric(s) needed to determine 
if the performance requirements are being met.  Table 3 provides a listing of potential 
metrics used in the BCA process.  The Operational Analysis must provide an estimate of 
the impact to current product support elements (for existing systems and subsystem 
components) or a projected estimate of the impact to product support elements (for 
developing systems/subsystems/components) to support the BCA process in the Business 
Analysis.  It also provides a basis for assessing potential (positive and negative) impacts 
to other existing systems, subsystems, components, and existing product support 
elements. 
The results of the Operational Analysis provide performance 
requirements and metrics that may be used in the PBA.  The PBA is an agreement 
between the warfighter and the PM that establishes Key Performance Parameters for 
support of a Weapon System.  The PBA is typically a short document in the form of a 
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) or Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).  This 
System Level PBA agreement defines outcomes for the overall PBL support strategy and 
contains measures of success to meet the warfighters’ needs.  Any subsequent agreements 
for subsystems and components should establish metrics that will contribute to the 
performance outcomes defined within the system level PBA.  Over the life of the 
program, the performance measures may change or evolve depending on the changing 
requirements of the program. 
The Business Analysis consists of the BCA and the PBL 
acquisition strategy.  The BCA is the decision making tool used to estimate the costs of 
different product support strategies.  It normally compares a baseline support strategy 
against one or more proposed PBL support strategies to determine the relevant cost of 
supporting a system, subsystem, or component at the levels identified in the Operational 
Analysis and PBA.  A BCA is required for all PBL candidates.  The BCA should be 
conducted using the latest, most accurate information available from the Operational 
Analysis and at a level commensurate with the program acquisition category (NAVAIR, 
2004). 
64 
The Acquisition Strategy should be developed in accordance with 
the latest DoD acquisition guidance and after the product support requirements and 
metrics have been determined.  The acquisition strategy should address: 
• PBL Determination 
• Budgeting and Funding 
• FMS 
• Procurement Issues 
• Contract Issues 
• Length of PBL Commitment 

































































Figure 5.   NAVAIR PBL Process.   
 Source: NAVAIRINST 4081.2A.  Policy Guidance for Performance Based Logistics 
Candidates  
 
d. Statutory Considerations 
There are numerous federal laws that apply to the outsourcing of depot 
maintenance workload.  Other sections of Title 10, U.S.C. that may affect the depot-level 
workloads associated with the PBL candidate include:  
• Section 2466, 50/50 Rule: Allows no more than 50% of the funds made available 
in a given fiscal year to a Military Department for depot-level maintenance and 
repair to be used to contract for performance by non-governmental personnel.  
Note: This statute is applied at the Service Component level (e.g., 50% of Navy-
wide funds). 
• Section 2469, > $3 Million Rule: (1) Requires public-private competition to move 
depot-level workload from an organic depot (over $3M annually) to the private 
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sector; and (2) Requires merit-based procedures to move depot-level workload 
from one organic depot (over $3M. annually) to another organic depot. 
• Section 2474, CITE - Public Private Partnerships: Designates depot-level 
activities as CITE.  Enables CITES to enter into public-private partnerships for 
the performance of work related to the core competencies of the center.  Also, 
allows private industry use of DoD facilities or equipment of the CITE that is not 
being fully utilized. 
• Section 2563, Articles and Services of Industrial Facilities - Sales to Persons 
Outside the DoD: This section authorizes the Services to sell articles and services 
outside DoD that are not readily available (time, quality, quantity) from a U.S. 
commercial source (NAVAIR, 2004). 
 
e. PBL Achievement of Cost-Wiseness 
Since their implentation, PBL contracts have proved to steadily decrease 
maintenance costs.  The achievement of availability metrics exceeded budgeted levels 
and below budgeted costs.  Design clean up/improvement, reliability improvements, 
repair TAT reductions, work process improvements, extension of high time limits, build 
specifications improvements, multi-year parts buys, flow down contracts with subs, better 
parts quality, and reduced demand have contributed to lower costs.  Specific examples of 
cost savings and efficiency are provided below: 
 F404 PBL (F/A-18A-D), a Four and 1/2 Year Firm-Fixed Price Contract 
achieved:  
o 100% Total Backorder Reduction Contract-to-Date 
o Availability 95% (Historical, 43%) 
o TAT Reduced by 25%; Backlog Reduced 50%  
 Navy’s First Public/Private Partnership, “Corporate Contract” awarded June 2000 
to Honeywell to provide support for Auxiliary Power Units (APU) used on the C-
2, F/A-18, S-3, and P-3 Aircraft 
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Asset Management  Pre TLS FY-05  Target 
Back Orders   123  0  0  
Availability   65%  91%   90% 
Logistics Response Time 35 days 6.6 days 5 days 
G Condition   232  0  0 
 
             Additional Benefits: 
o $50M+ savings/cost avoidances to Navy 
o 79 configuration changes implemented to address reliability (18) and correct 
drawing errors, improve maintainability, or address obsolescence (61) 
o 110 APUs ($14M) removed from inventory due to improved asset 
management 
o Depot TAT reduced from 98 to 67 days (25%) 
o Commercial Best Practices (LSS) standardized at NADEPs and Honeywell 
o Corporate contract enabled adding KC-130 APU, P-3 engine driven 
compressor and F/A-18 main engine fuel control and allows Joint Services 
efforts 
o All F404 MFC backorders eliminated November 2005; 12 F404-402 
conversions completed in 2005 
 Savings using PBL versus Traditional Repair 
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PBL Vs. Traditional Repair (Notional)
PBL
¾ Parts Cost: $300,000
¾ Labor & Admin Costs: 
$34,000
¾ Total Cost: $334,000
¾ Average Life: 2,000 
hours
¾ Cost per hour: $167
Traditional Repair
¾ Parts Cost: $120,000
¾ Labor & Admin Costs: 
$34,000
¾ Total Cost: $154,000
¾ Average Life: 375 hours
¾ Cost per hour: $411
 
Figure 6.   Comparison of PBL and Traditional Repair.   
Source: Performance Based Logistics brief presented to 15th TACOM LCMC/Industry 
Logistics Symposium on 15 March 2006. 
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IV. RADAR CENTER OF EXCELLENCE (COE) 
A. FUNCTIONAL PROCESS DESCRIPTION 
The AIMD NAS Lemoore provides aviation support for the Navy’s F/A-18 Super 
Hornet.  It also has the responsibility of managing a proof of concept pilot program called 
the Radar Center of Excellence (COE).  The Radar COE was established in May 2006 as 
an AN/APG-65/73 radar maintenance work center performing maintenance and 
calibration for the entire CNAF (D. Stephens, personal communication, 13 September 
2006, 2006).  The AN/APG-65/73 radar is a critical component of the F/A-18 Super 
Hornet, providing fire control capabilities during air-to-air and air-to-ground missions.  It 
is also the most expensive and most common degrader on the F/A-18 (D. Stephens, 
personal communication, 13 September 2006).  The Radar COE will “find smart ways to 
fix radars” by integrating former depot-level and intermediate-level maintenance activity 
elements into a seamless continuum of maintenance, logistics, and engineering support 
(D. Stephens, personal communication, 13 September 2006).  Additionally, in order to 
provide a definitive basis for future decision-making, each the Radar COE develops 
detailed analysis of the long-term benefits and realistic assessment of associated risks.  
NAS Lemoore’s Radar COE is also the future site for FRC West, and so the 
comprehensive FRC implementation plan that is being developed by the NAE will 
encompass the COE’s analysis of it’s financial management, total force management, 
data analysis, maintenance information systems/IT, logistics, engineering, supply chain 
management, maintenance processes, and quality assurance.  This evaluation will be 
critical in adequately planning and establishing FRC West in a manner which 
encompasses a fully-integrated business approach (NAVRIIP, 2006).   
The Radar COE framework is not completely new as it is very similar to Centers 
of Industrial and Technical Excellence (CITEs) (SECNAV, 2005).  Title 10 U.S.C. 
Section 2474 declares a CITE a consolidated depot maintenance activity entering into 
public-private partnerships to perform work related to the specific core competencies of 
the designee (SECNAV, 2005).  Section 2474 specifically discusses three criteria 





(1) The Secretary concerned, or the Secretary of Defense in the case of a 
Defense Agency, shall designate each depot-level activity of the military 
departments and the Defense Agencies (other than facilities approved for 
closure or major realignment under the Defense Base Closure and 
Realignment Act of 1990 (part A of title XXIX of Public Law 101–510; 
10 U.S.C. 2687 note)) as a Center of Industrial and Technical Excellence 
in the recognized core competencies of the designee.  
 (2) The Secretary of Defense shall establish a policy to encourage the 
Secretary of each military department and the head of each Defense 
Agency to reengineer industrial processes and adopt best-business 
practices at their Centers of Industrial and Technical Excellence in 
connection with their core competency requirements, so as to serve as 
recognized leaders in their core competencies throughout the Department 
of Defense and in the national technology and industrial base (as defined 
in section 2500 (1) of this title).  
 (3) The Secretary of a military department may conduct a pilot program, 
consistent with applicable requirements of law, to test any practices 
referred to in paragraph (2) that the Secretary determines could improve 
the efficiency and effectiveness of operations at Centers of Industrial and 
Technical Excellence, improve the support provided by the Centers for the 
armed forces user of the services of the Centers, and enhance readiness by 
reducing the time that it takes to repair equipment.  
Public-Private Partnerships: 
 (1) To achieve one or more objectives set forth in paragraph (2), the 
Secretary designating a Center of Industrial and Technical Excellence 
under subsection (a) may authorize and encourage the head of the Center 
to enter into public-private cooperative arrangements (in this section 
referred to as a “public-private partnership”) to provide for any of the 
following:  
            (a) For employees of the Center, private industry, or other entities 
outside the Department of Defense to perform (under contract, 
subcontract, or otherwise) work related to the core competencies of the 
Center, including any depot-level maintenance and repair work that 
involves one or more core competencies of the Center.  
            (b) For private industry or other entities outside the Department of 
Defense to use, for any period of time determined to be consistent with the 
needs of the Department of Defense, any facilities or equipment of the 
Center that are not fully utilized for a military department’s own 
production or maintenance requirements.  
71 
(2) The objectives for exercising the authority provided in paragraph (1) 
are as follows:  
          (a) To maximize the utilization of the capacity of a Center of 
Industrial and Technical Excellence.  
          (b) To reduce or eliminate the cost of ownership of a Center by the 
Department of Defense in such areas of responsibility as operations and 
maintenance and environmental remediation.  
          (c) To reduce the cost of products of the Department of Defense 
produced or maintained at a Center.  
          (d) To leverage private sector investment in—  
                      (i) such efforts as plant and equipment recapitalization for a 
Center; and  
                      (ii) the promotion of the undertaking of commercial business 
ventures at a Center.  
          (e) To foster cooperation between the armed forces and private 
industry.  
(3) If the Secretary concerned, or the Secretary of Defense in the case of a 
Defense Agency, authorizes the use of public-private partnerships under 
this subsection, the Secretary shall submit to Congress a report evaluating 
the need for loan guarantee authority, similar to the ARMS Initiative loan 
guarantee program under section 4555 of this title, to facilitate the 
establishment of public-private partnerships and the achievement of the 
objectives set forth in paragraph (2).  
 
The three criteria establishing designation and three criteria establishing public-
private partnership under Section 2474 are applicable to the COE since the Radar COE 
will be a recognized core competency for the Fleet as it will perform maintenance and 
calibration on the AN/APG-65/73 radar.  NAS Lemoore has not received official 
designation from CNAF as the Radar COE but once it does, it will serve as a recognized 
leader in their core competency throughout the Navy (D. Stephens, personal 
communication, 13 September 2006).  The COE is a pilot program testing the efficiency 
and effectiveness of operations that enhance readiness by reducing the time that it takes 
to repair radars.  Finally, the COE has entered into a public-private partnership to have 
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work performed that relates to its core competencies.  Raytheon Company, the 
manufacture of the AN/APG-65/73 radar, has an AN/APG-65/73 radar technician 
working at NAS Lemoore full-time.  Although the COE and CITE carry different labels, 
the end result is the same; consolidate depot-level maintenance activities to produce the 
most cost-effective use of tax dollars (McCain, 2001).  
 
1. Working Model of AIRSpeed in the Naval Aviation Enterprise (NAE) 
The Radar COE has integrated Theory of Constraints (TOC) and Lean Six Sigma 
methodologies in order to apply them across the entire enterprise (A. Ioannidis, personal 
communication, 4 August 2006).  Lean Six Sigma concentrates on the removal of 
multiple elements, inputs, sub-processes, and anything that does not add value to the 
production process thereby reducing the Cycle Time for the product or service provided 
to the intended user.  TOC focuses on the idea that all organizations have at least one 
constraint and that any improvements on non-constraints may not yield as significant ROI 
as working on the constraint itself.  It is based on market demand (pull) in which physical 
inventory (buffer levels) are formed and related processes at maintenance activities are 
based on actual demand (pull) measured as the time to reliably replenish (TRR).  TRR 
illustrates how much time elapses to replenish a product, resource, or material.    
To effectively and efficiently prepare ready for tasking (RFT) aircraft, AIRSpeed 
focuses on the proper levels of shop replaceable assemblies (SRA) and consumable parts, 
in order to facilitate the decrease in the acquisition for new more expensive weapon 
replaceable assemblies (WRA) (Nieto, 1994).  WRA is the standard term given to all 
replaceable components of avionic equipment installed in an aircraft and the SRA 
includes all portions of the aircraft.  A WRA is composed entirely of SRAs but does not 
include cable assemblies, mounts, fuse boxes, or circuit breakers.  A WRA failure is 
defined as a deteriorated performance level that would cause a required function of the 
assembly to be unavailable if the WRA were installed in the next higher assembly (i.e., 
an avionic weapon system platform).  SRA failure is defined as a performance level that 




Figure 7.   Process Flow Diagram for Enterprise AIRSpeed.   
                                             Source: Nieto, Enterprise AIRSpeed 1994. 
 
The AIRSpeed design identifies those areas where Lean Six Sigma can reduce the 
constraint on RFT aircraft, i.e. TRR.  It is essential to maintain WRA and supporting 
SRA inventory levels that are capable of sustaining aircraft readiness.  End user demand 
patterns and TRR levels impact these inventories, and so the process flow is monitored to 
maintain a balance between TRR and inventory allowance levels.  A reduction in TRR is 
not [always] cost effective because it causes WRA and SRA inventories to decline more 
often, which hinders the ability to meet demand (Nieto, 1994).    
Figure 7 demonstrates this design within the supply and maintenance process flow 
for AIRSpeed Enterprises.  Within the figure, the Flightline is the O-level which is where 
demand starts.  The green dotted arrow is the flow of failed SRAs and WRAs that will be 
inducted to I-level maintenance.  Not-ready-for-issue (NRFI) components are the same as 
failed SRAs and WRAs.  AIMD/MALS IMA (Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance 
Depot/Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron Intermediate Maintenance Activity) is the I-
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level.  When repair capability does not exist at the I-level, NRFIs flow to NAVSUP 
(Naval Supply Systems Command) as depicted by the red dotted arrow.  From NAVSUP, 
the failed SRAs and WRAs flow to the D-level for repair.  (Agripino, et al., 2002)  
NAVSUP manages a number of programs that have direct impact on the combat 
readiness of the Fleet including inventory control points (ICP), Fleet and Industrial 
Supply Centers (FISC), and Defense Depots (DD).  All materials used by the Navy are 
considered items  of  supply  and  will  be  managed  by  an  ICP.  Excluded  are  those 
 items  assigned  to  a  single  agency  or military service inventory manager for 
supporting retail stock or end-use requirements of the military services.  FISCs provide a 
variety of logistics support services to fleet, shore activities, and overseas bases.  DDs are 
regional storage points for Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) material.  Issue of material 
from a DD is directed by the responsible Defense Supply Center (DSC) and is based on 
requisitions received and processed by the DSC.   
After inducting failed SRAs and WRAs to the I-level, the O-level generates 
supply requisitions for ready-for-issue (RFI) components.  O-level requisitions are filled 
from the inventory of material maintained in the SRA and WRA stock buffers.  NAVSUP 
inventory managers monitor and manage the issue and demand of material in these 
buffers as displayed by the solid blue and red arrows in Figure 7.  Inventory control 
responsibilities include determining:  material requirements, replenishment actions, 
quantity of material to be on hand and on order to sustain current operations, financial 
requirements initiating procurement and disposal material, disposition of material, the 
repositioning of material, and the requirement for original equipment manufacturer 
(OEM) components.  Unneeded materials and worn-out components are turned in to the 
Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office (DRMO).  In managing end-user material, 
FISCs are responsible for determining inventory levels, procuring, receiving, storing, 






Figure 8.   Process Flow Diagram for Radar COE.   
                 Source: Stephens, D. NAS Lemoore COE Supply Chain Radar Brief, 2006. 
 
To achieve a truly Lean approach, some organizational structures within the 
current [Enterprise AIRSpeed model] must be integrated (Agripino, et al., 2002).  Figure 
8, the process flow diagram for the Radar COE, illustrates this with the consolidation and 
integration of the following sustainment functions: in-service engineering, logistics 
support, intermediate/depot maintenance, operational support, and supply support.  This 
organizational framework facilitates close coordination between operational support and 
lifecycle support networks.  Within Figure 8, Demand Activities A, B, and C represent 
the O-level which is where demand starts.  The dotted arrows flowing from the Demand 
Activities illustrate failed radars that will be inducted into maintenance at the COE.  The 
Radar COE is an integrated I-level/D-level maintenance organization performing 
lifecycle that includes servicing, inspecting, testing, adjustment, alignment, removal, 
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replacement, reinstallation, troubleshooting, calibration, repair, modification, and 
overhaul of AN/APG-65/73 radar systems and components.  At the point of induction, 
AN/APG-65/73 radar systems and components are sent to specific work centers 
responsible for a particular component.  When repair capability does not exist at the 
COE, NRFIs flow to DRMO or to the OEM as depicted by the dotted arrow.  The OEM 
will refurbish, reuse, and incorporate the component into a new product with its own 
brand name (Stephens, 2006a). 
Squadron and Carrier replacement requisitions are filled from the inventory of 
material maintained in the Demand Activity buffers.  In Figure 8, each Demand 
Activity’s TRR S1 is initiated once an AN/APG-65/73 radar NRFI component is received 
by the Radar COE for maintenance.  Once repairs are complete, RFI components are 
shipped to appropriate Demand Activity Buffers to ensure continuing end user 
requirements are met.  Consumable and repairable components are replenished from 
NAVSUP and used to repair the NRFI component.  The [Radar COE’s] integrated design 
should result in significant cost savings and improved cycle time performance, 
outperforming a conventional [D-level organization], because it integrates a “Lean” 
framework for sustaining operational support, inventory control, and process 
improvement functions (Agripino, et al., 2002).  TRR, a key metric for Leanness, should 
be reduced as lead times and TATs are decreased to an absolute minimum to obtain low 
cost, high quality, and on-time material availability.  
According to the AIRSpeed Officer at AIMD NAS Lemoore, the integrated model 
for the Radar COE has generated greater efficiencies but is not without its challenges (D. 
Stephens, personal communication, 13 September 2006).  The Radar COE is a pilot 
program still maturing as a viable AIRSpeed with concerns that begin with the occasional 
non-availability of material, consumables, and repairables.  The current allowancing 
policy currently dictates inventory levels to support the I-Level demand (D. Stephens, 
personal communication, 13 September 2006).  With the integration of I-Level and D-
Level maintenance occurring at the Radar COE, this policy will not represent the quantity 
that is required to sustain operations.  Greater than normal demands and inadequate 
replenishment stocks can negatively impact the COE’s ability to meet established TRRs.  
Inventory management requires control of and  agreement  between  stock  and  stock 
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records, accurate  control procedures,  evaluating  usage,  and anticipating  requirements.  
The COE must ensure that ordering times, fill rates, maintenance TATs, and other 
metrics realistically portray the impact and interaction of their supply, transportation, 
maintenance, and procurement systems.  Determining the scope and quantity of 
consumables and repairables to be procured and stocked must be constantly evaluated 
and adjusted to sustain a Lean operation. 
Another challenge is ensuring that the Radar COE design comprises core 
capabilities with sufficient support equipment, resources, and sufficient surge capacity to 
meet the desired TRRs (D. Stephens, personal communication, 13 September 2006).  
Core capability, at a minimum, includes skilled artisans, equipment, and facilities needed 
to accomplish maintenance at the Radar COE.  To comply with the statutory 
requirements set forth in Title 10 U.S.C. Sections 2464 and 2474, the [COE] determines 
its core capability requirements and the workloads needed to sustain that capability 
(OSD, 2004).  The Radar COE’s infrastructure and capability shape will be sized to 
support Naval readiness when organizational agility, flexibility, and proximity to the 
operating forces are crucial to accomplish the mission (OSD, 2004).  
Other barriers include determining who owns what and who pays for what as 
assets are intermingled and integrated (D. Stephens, personal communication, 13 
September 2006).  For example, there are currently two active systems to order 
consumables and SRAs at the COE; Naval Aviation Logistics Command Management 
Information System (NALCOMIS) and the Monthly Maintenance Plan (MMP).  
NALCOMIS is an automated information management system that provides the COE 
with the information to aid in the day-to-day management of the maintenance effort.  The 
system provides detailed procedures to enter, collect, process, store, review, and report 
maintenance and flight data that are required to manage the maintenance organization 
(OPNAVINST 4790.2J, 2005).  The MMP provides an outlook of upcoming scheduled 
maintenance, which includes inspections, transfers, and receipts of aircraft.  By 
developing a strategy for scheduled maintenance, managers can determine the capability 




resources in advance of the actual demand.  As the Radar COE continues its 
implementation of the new model, these issues will be reviewed and addressed in future 
refinements of the organization.   
 
B. PERFORMANCE IMPACT AND METRICS 
The Radar COE represents a key element in AIMD Lemoore’s transformation to 
FRC West; ultimately having the capability to sustain RFT aircraft for the Fleet.  The 
COE concept organizes activities to optimize repair procedures.  This concentrates radar 
repair expertise in fewer places and builds the foundation in business process 
improvements envisioned for the FRC.  Decreased cycle times and decreased TRRs are 
the projected metric as duplicate and useless procedures are eliminated.  Additionally, 
creating a “culture of cost consciousness integration” and interoperability will improve 
“the feedback loop between all levels of maintenance” (Fathke, 2005).  After the 
application of TOC principles and Lean Six Sigma at the COE, radar maintenance 
became a more controlled and stable process.  Furthermore, TRR trends and irregularities 
were identifiable, explainable, and traceable (Stephens, 2006b).  
TRR metric reporting provides a means for the COE to analyze and chart their 
TRR performance data to determine “their health in operating in a time domain” 
(AIRSpeed, 2005).  Figure 9 compares TRR trends at AIMD Lemoore before and after 
TOC implementation.  The pie charts and histogram within Figure 9 use black, red, 
yellow, and green color coding which is characteristic of AIRSpeed reports.  Each 
indicator has a threshold for each color rating.  TRR indicators become yellow when a 
NRFI is expected to be close to or over that threshold and red when it is definitely going 
to go over and action needs to be taken.  TRR indicators become black when a NRFI has 
gone over the TRR threshold.  When any work center within the Depot is first turned on, 
there may be components in the queue that are in various TRR statuses (AIRSpeed, 
2005).  The general scheduling rule is First-In-First-Out.  NRFIs are acted on in this 
sequence until repaired or worked as much as possible and put to the side if not workable, 
e.g. awaiting parts, awaiting mechanic, etc.  In that situation, the next NRFI on the 
schedule goes to the work center.  Enterprise AIRSpeed procedures dictate risk 
management of the impact on other items in process when adjusting workload priorities 
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to act on NRFIs that have become black.  A black item that will be a quick fix should be 
a low risk to act on before a red or yellow item.  Management of work-in-process (WIP) 
items occurs by working the workable red, yellow and then green.   
 
Figure 9.   Pie Charts and Histogram of TRR Trends at the Radar COE.   
                  Stephens, D. NAS Lemoore COE Supply Chain Radar Brief, 2006. 
 
Increased training, focused efforts, and TOC implementation have resulted in a 
39% reduction in the WIP components from 2432 to 1865 (Figure 9).  There has also 
been a 9% reduction in the number of WIP components that have TRRs in the black.  
While there has been a reduction in the number of WIP components in the black, they 
still represent the majority (91%) of all components in WIP.  AIMD Lemoore attributes 
the high level of WIP items in black to the increase of items being inducted as a result of 
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the integration of I-Level and D-Level maintenance.  Maintenance managers are 
constantly analyzing processes and implementing actions to establish stability in the COE 
design.  For example, to mitigate items with black TRRs, managers established two full 
shifts working four days a week for ten hours a day.  There were also work sections 
working Friday and Saturday in order to increase work center utilization by 32 hours a 
week.  
Figure 10.   Histogram of AN/APG-65/73 Radar TRR Days Before Applying Theory 
of Constraints.   
                    Source: Stephens, D. NAS Lemoore COE Supply Chain Radar Brief, 2006. 
 
 
Figure 10 displays 351 AN/APG-65/73 radars awaiting maintenance from 
November 2004 to June 2005 prior to the implementation of TOC at AIMD Lemoore.  
The radar TRR indicators were in the black, having gone over the TRR threshold.  The 
radars were categorized according to NALCOMIS job status code.  The following is an 
explanation of each NALCOMIS Job Status Code according to the Naval Aviation 
Maintenance Program (NAMP), Vol. III, COMNAVAIRFORINST 4790.2, 2005:  
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 M3 Time – AWM (Awaiting Maintenance) Backlog: Any workload in 
excess of work center capability 
 AWP (Awaiting Parts) Time – The time during which the component was 
not being worked on while awaiting repair parts not available locally 
 AWP (Awaiting Parts) Iterations – Repairs cannot be completed because 
only some repair parts have been received while awaiting the remaining 
repair parts not available locally  
 Weekend/Holiday – Any maintenance requirement that exists beyond 
normal working hours 
 M5 Time - AWM (Awaiting Maintenance) Other: Any performance of 
maintenance precluded by weather, operational conditions, general drill, 
training, shipboard/shore station imposed restrictions, etc. 
 Test Equipment – Lack of adequate test equipment to performance 
maintenance 
 M8 Time - AWM (Awaiting Maintenance) Awaiting Other Shops: No 
further maintenance can be performed due to shops or maintenance actions 
 S1 Time - AWM (Awaiting Maintenance) in Depot: Awaiting the return 
of a component in process in the Depot.  (COMNAVAIRFORINST 




Figure 11.   Histogram of AN/APG-65/73 Radar TRR Days After Applying Theory of 
Constraints.   
               Source: Stephens, D. NAS Lemoore COE Supply Chain Radar Brief, 2006. 
 
Figure 11 displays 323 AN/APG-65/73 radars awaiting maintenance from June 
2005 to July 2006 since the implementation of TOC at the Radar COE.  Over this 13 
month period, there were 28 less radars in the black.  This was an 8% reduction in 
comparison to the amount illustrated over 8 months in Figure 10.  Since TOC 
implementation, radars with M3 job status codes decreased by 39%.  Radars with AWP 
job status codes went up by 6, which was a 7% increase.  Radars with AWP Iterations job 
status codes also went up by 6, which as a 23% increase.  Radars with Weekend/Holiday 
job status codes went up by 27, which was a 180% increase.  Radars with M5 job status 
codes went up by 5, which was a 63% increase.  Radars with Test Equipment job status 
codes went up by 13, which was an increase of 216%.  Radars with a job status code of 
M8 decreased by 40%, which was a reduction of 2.  Radars with job status codes S1 went 




Figure 12.   Histogram of Current AN/APG-65/73 Radar TRR Days.   
     Source: Stephens, D. NAS Lemoore COE Supply Chain Radar Brief, 2006. 
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Figure 13.   Histogram of Current and Pre-Activation AN/APG-65/73 Radar TRR 
Days.   
     Source: Stephens, D. NAS Lemoore COE Supply Chain Radar Brief, 2006. 
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The Radar COE has experienced improvements by applying TOC and Lean Six 
Sigma principles as evidenced by the reductions captured in Figure 9, Figure 10, and 
Figure 11.  Further review of Figure 9, Figure 10, Figure 11, and Figure 14 shows that 
radars with job status AWP and M3 (AWM (Awaiting Maintenance) Backlog) are the 
highest categories in spite of any overall reductions that are realized.  Figure 13 provides 
a comparison of AN/APG-65/73 radars having gone over the TRR threshold before and 
after the implementation of TOC at AIMD Lemoore.  While the Radar COE continues to 
transform based on cost-wise readiness and the Lean paradigm, it still is affected by the 
“inefficiency and complexity of the current military sustainment model” (Agripino, et al., 
2002).  The supply system that is necessary to replenish the RFI stock inventory and 
consumables required to support the end user is a “sustainment system [with] uncoupled 
processes, fragmented organizational structures, and uncoordinated distribution channels” 
(Agripino, et al., 2002).  This unresponsive support system hinders the evolving 









Figure 14.   Pie Charts Comparing AN/APG-65/73 Radar TRR Days Before and 
After Applying Theory of Constraints.   
       Source: Stephens, D. NAS Lemoore COE Supply Chain Radar Brief, 2006. 
Note: The pre-activation pie chart covers 8 months while the post-activation pie chart covers 13 
months.  During TOC pre-activation, more radars broke the TRR threshold in less time.  
During TOC post-activation, less radars broke the TRR threshold over a longer time period. 
 
 
C. OPERATIONAL COST SAVINGS AND SUCCESSES 
How does the Radar COE know if it is Lean?  Appropriately chosen metrics are 
the performance characteristics that are used to assess whether [this] enterprise is Lean 
(Agripino, et al., 2002).  Some examples include reducing cycle time, lowering costs, 
minimizing waste, improving quality, and reducing time to reliably replenish (TRR).  
These demonstrated metrics used to measure improvements have also been applied at 
AIMD Lemoore.  Great strides have been made in creating the culture of cost-wise 
readiness at the COE using Enterprise AIRSpeed principles as the key enabler to their 
success.  By reducing TRRs and decreasing inventories, [the COE has been] able to 
reduce the number of personnel and assets required to support [itself] (Kemna, 2005).  
The COE is supporting the Fleet Response Plan (FRP) by providing RFT aircraft.  The 
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entire NAE has benefited from reduced inventories, lower operating expenses, and 
manpower reductions.  Decreased cycle times mean improved logistics and maintenance 
response.   
At the end of 2005, AIRSpeed efficiencies resulted in $123 million made 
available for other O&M requirements (Massenburg, 2005).  AIMD sailors are working 
an average of 8 hours instead of 12 hours.  Re-enlistment rates for Enlisted Sailors have 
risen from 47% to over 76%.  Radar shop repair processing time has been reduced from 
14 days to 2 days.  The work center that manages aircraft armament equipment improved 
its issue/receipt process which resulted in the removal of 6 sailors that were then placed 
into repair work centers.   
Beyond Capability of Maintenance (BCM) interdiction is a critical expectation of 
the COE and FRC model.  BCM is a term used by maintenance depots when repair is not 
authorized at that level, when an activity is not capable of accomplishing the repair 
because of a lack of equipment, facilities, technical skills, technical data, or parts, or 
when shop backlog precludes repair within time limits specified by existing directives 
(COMNAVAIRFORINST 4790.2 Vol. III, 2005).  BCM interdiction provides a 
significant reduction in Aviation Depot Level Repairable (AVDLR) costs to the Fleet, 
since repairs will be accomplished in-place to the maximum extent possible.  This 
reduces costs associated with sending repairables off-station for repair and aligns the 
financial accountability to the consumer of the resource (Fathke, 2005).  Although the 
AIMD at NAS Lemoore continues to process BCM assets, they continue to mitigate 
many more with the Radar COE project as it matures as an FRC with the integration of 
D-Level artisans (D. Stephens, personal communication, 13 September 2006).    
The Radar COE exists as another AIRSpeed pilot program that has met the 
challenge of creating dynamic cultural change at all levels of the enterprise.  
Furthermore, the COE represents the beneficial attributes that all aviation maintenance 
and supply organizations will attain once the principles of AIRSpeed become a core 
competency within the entire NAE.  No longer can Naval Aviation afford to operate in 
the same manner, therefore better practices [have been] incorporated in order to achieve 
cost-wise readiness, [affordability, and flexibility] in future aircraft acquisitions and re-
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capitalization of our aging Fleet (Nieto, 1994).  The Navy has seen greater value in 
consolidating their separate activities and using best practices and continuous 

















The goal of this research project was to identify the funding formulation and the 
current cost trends of maintaining an aging fleet of aircraft and to provide an analysis of 
current and future maintenance programs designed to build efficiency and reduce total 
ownership costs.  Specifically, the study examined the Radar Center of Excellence at 
NAS Lemoore as it relates to cost-wise readiness and Enterprise AIRSpeed.  The 
methodology of the study involved a description of the funding elements of aviation 
maintenance and review of the current processes and future initiatives associated with 
Aircraft Operations Maintenance.  We also reviewed resource and performance data used 
by aircraft maintenance policy officers and AIRSpeed officers to determine resource 
requirements essential in defining maintenance capabilities.  Additionally, the study 
highlighted critical analysis taken from Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) studies, Base 
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) reports, General Accounting Office (GAO) reports, 
public laws pertaining to DoD maintenance, Naval Aviation Maintenance Subsystem 
Reporting (NAMSR) Plus maintenance and material data, and FY03 and FY04 Execution 
of the Operations Plan-20 (OP-20), in order to (1) understand the ability of gaining 
depots to absorb additional work loads; and (2) understand legislative actions mandating 
specific criteria relating to maintenance initiatives. 
  
B. ANSWERS TO PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTION 
1. To what degree of effectiveness is the Navy presently able to meet its aircraft 
maintenance requirements with its current resources? 
The complete FRC implementation across the Navy coupled with an analysis of 
the FRC’s financial management, total force management, maintenance information 
systems/information technology, logistics, engineering, supply chain management, and 
maintenance processes will be necessary to determine if the AIRSpeed design has reaped 
any significant improvements to the efficiency, effectiveness, and cost effects of the 
program.  However, substantial improvements are evident in the ability of Commander, 
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Naval Air Forces (CNAF) aviation maintenance managers in implementing, validating, 
and sustaining Enterprise AIRSpeed programs.  The Navy’s composite approach that 
operates under a triad of existing methodologies: Theory of Constraints (TOC), Lean 
production and Six Sigma, demonstrates the emergence of improved processes, improved 
tracking and forecasting maintenance tools, and more accurate inputs used in the 
construction of budget, maintenance, and procurement plans.  These developments then 
translate into an improvement in the overall execution of aviation maintenance i.e. cost-
wise readiness (tied to the demands of combatant commanders); improved time on wing 
(better equipment with better maintenance so that it stays on the aircraft longer); greater 
speed/reduced cycle time (aircraft and components spending less time in maintenance); 
improved reliability (quality); and reduced total costs.  Chapter III, paragraph B.1.d and 
Chapter IV, section C highlight many of the qualitative and quantitative successes of 
aviation maintenance transformation initiatives.  In these instances, by focusing on four 
key metrics: inventory, cycle time, quality, and total cost; the AIRSpeed model has 
improved all aspects of maintenance supply responsiveness – for the benefit of the 
warfighter. 
Answers to the secondary research questions will provide specific outcomes 
resulting from the aircraft maintenance model enhancements and subsequent process 
changes. 
 
C. ANSWERS TO SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. What specific changes, if any, have been made to aircraft maintenance process 
models to improve efficiency and effectiveness of current programs? 
Chapter III of the study highlights the specific changes to aircraft maintenance 
process models.  Chapter IV of the study provides specific details of the Enterprise 
AIRSpeed model process flow.  Current and forecasted inefficiencies, inept maintenance 
operations, constrained processes, and inadequate funds resulting from pouring dollars 
into achieving capabilities today at the expense of future capabilities were the key 
reasons for change within the Navy.  The following is a summary of those changes. 
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AIRSpeed:  AIRSpeed is a unique efficiency model that has created an integrated 
culture of self-sustaining CPI aligned toward delivering mission requirements at reduced 
resource cost for the NAE.  There are three AIRSpeed programs: Depot, Enterprise and 
NAVAIR; each employing industry-proven best business processes and methodologies to 
reduce cycle time, improve productivity, and focus on the total aviation solution within 
all levels of supply and maintenance.   
Fleet Readiness Centers (FRC):  The FRC concept integrates former depot-level 
and intermediate-level maintenance activity elements into a seamless continuum of 
maintenance, logistics, and engineering support.  This strategy positions maintenance 
activities closer to Fleet concentrations when doing so will result in enhanced 
effectiveness and efficiency, greater agility, allowing Naval Aviation to achieve the right 
readiness at the least cost.  Furthermore, the transformation to FRCs will see more 
integration and collaboration between depot level Civil Service personnel and Military 
intermediate level Sailors and Marines, thus achieving “cost-wiseness” by lowering the 
costs for repairing expensive AVDLRs; reducing repair turn around time; and by 
eventually allowing a significant cost-avoidance through careful reductions in the number 
of spare parts required to maintain the required number of RFI spares on the shelves. 
Virtual SYSCOM:  This system has supported the paradigm shift to working 
across functions thereby creating opportunities for sharing information and integrating 
operational concepts.  The Virtual SYSCOM serves as a Navy enabler in identifying 
redundant processes and achieving enterprise management efficiencies.   
Public-Privatization Partnerships:  Public-private partnerships related to the core 
competencies of the Navy enterprise reduce or eliminate the cost of ownership, maximize 
the utilization of depot capacity, and reduce the cost of products.  Furthermore, these 
partnerships have fostered greater collaboration and cooperation between the Navy and 
the private industry. 
Performance Based Logistics (PBL):  PBL contracts have proved to steadily 
decrease maintenance costs through performance based strategies, and buying outcomes, 
not products or services.  By purchasing long-term support as an integrated, affordable, 
performance package designed to optimize system readiness and performance goals, the  
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best-value determination and assessment of public and private capabilities, infrastructure, 
skills base, past performance, and proven capabilities can be made to meet performance 
objectives. 
2. If changes have been made, have they produced any significant and measurable 
improvements in readiness and cost? 
As previously mentioned, the most significant outcome of using the various 
aircraft maintenance process models is reflected in direct cost savings, reduced cycle 
time, improved processes, improved tracking and forecasting maintenance tools, and 
more accurate inputs used in the construction of budget, maintenance, and procurement 
plans.  Chapter III, paragraph B.1.d and Chapter IV, section C highlight such 
improvements as North Island’s F/A-18 turnaround time reduction from 192 days to 132 , 
the average Work-In-Progress (WIP) reduction of 37% and AIRSpeed efficiencies 
resulting in $123 million made available for other O&M requirements.  An accurate 
assessment of any recognized benefits will require the complete implementation of FRCs 
across the Navy and the execution of budget cycles thereafter to ascertain what if any 
program efficiencies eventually materialize.  
3. How will future budgeting affect aircraft maintenance processes? 
The Navy is ensuring wise and informed decisions are made before each dollar is 
spent, and that each expense serves an intended purpose.  Employing cost-wise 
techniques in incorporating process improvement initiatives in maintenance operations 
and workforce development will have to be continuous and dynamic with the potential 
future of constrained budgeting challenges.  
 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
Reduced budgets, constrained maintenance processes, fragmented organizational 
structures, and the prospect of having inadequate future aircraft capabilities have forced 
the Navy to re-evaluate how to manage the total life cycle of its fleet of aircraft.  Cost-
wise initiatives, such as AIRSpeed, have presented viable solutions to uncoordinated 
systems, non-value added processes, and budget problems; focusing on improving the 
entire Navy enterprise.  The Navy has maximized the fundamental principles of being 
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Lean production, Six Sigma, and TOC, through the integration of the processes, 
organizational restructuring, overhauling maintenance, supply, and inventory functions to 
insure that a total systems engineering approach is effectively and efficiently used.  The 
AIRSpeed model provides the necessary framework to develop this total systems 
approach to Lean sustainment of ready for tasking aircraft.  The incorporation of aircraft 
maintenance process changes, reflect compliance with the Fleet Response Plan (FRP), 
Navy transformation vision, and provide enhanced capabilities in supporting an aging 
fleet of aircraft that are increasingly expensive to maintain. 
  
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
1. Since the Radar COE at NAS Lemoore is still maturing and will also be the 
future site for FRC West, a study of the effectiveness of the COE once complete and used 
for a few years could provide beneficial information to improve the comprehensive FRC 
implementation plan.    
2. Perform an analysis of the FRC implementation across the Navy once complete 
and (a) determine the amount of recurring overhead savings and inventory reduction 
savings realized and (b) determine if workload distribution between the government and 
contractor establishments are properly accounted for and recorded.  The lack of sufficient 
quantitative data precludes the drawing of any definitive conclusions from the current 
study. 
3. Perform an analysis of all the active aviation maintenance PBL contracts the 
Navy has in place in comparison to targeted use baselines and methodologies to (a) 
determine cost effectiveness of the contracts, (b) determine the level of complexity in 
assessing costs and performance of contracts, (c) determine if the contracts are actually 
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